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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Religious freedom only makes entire sense as a social and constitutional 
arrangement on the supposition that God exists (or very likely exists); that 
God makes claims on the loyalty and conduct of human beings; and that 
such claims, rightly perceived and understood, are prior to, and superior to, 
the claims of any human authority.  Simply put: God’s commands—God’s 
will, God’s purposes—rightfully trump man’s.  Freedom of religion, 
understood as a human legal right, is government’s recognition of the 
priority and superiority of God’s true commands over anything the state or 
anyone else requires or forbids. 
That is the essence of religious liberty, understood as a natural law right.  
So understood, it is not a right that human authorities confer on those whom 
they rule—a dispensation.  That would be, subtly and ironically, inconsistent 
with the very liberty the state purports to confer.  It would be an assertion, at 
some level, of the priority and supremacy of the state and not God: the state, 
in its beneficence, grants the exercise of religion—the strivings of 
individuals and groups to discern and fulfill their duties to God, in good 
faith, as they understand them—a certain amount of leeway.  But the nature 
and extent of such freedom is, on such a view, ultimately for the state to 
judge. 
The state-conferred-dispensation view, which I think is the dominant 
view today, is not really religious liberty, in the sense of freedom of 
religious exercise from ultimate state control.  It is a cipher, shadow, or 
parody of religious liberty.  At bottom, what justifies religious liberty—the 
only thing that makes it at all sensible as a liberty distinct from other 
liberties—is some shared sense that true religious obligation is more 
important than civil obligation and that, consequently, civil society must 
recognize this truth.  Religious liberty is the legal duty of civil society to 
defer to the plausibly true free exercise of genuine religious faith. 
That is the only conception that can fully justify the idea of 
constitutional protection of “free exercise” of religion—protection of 
freedom of religious conduct in opposition to the state’s typical commands. 
The same premises support a related aspect of religious freedom (embodied 
in the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment): Because God’s 
commands, rightly perceived, trump the state’s commands, it makes no 
sense to say that the state can determine what God’s commands are and 
whether an individual or group has rightly perceived them.  The state may 
not in this respect, or any other, set itself up as the arbiter of religious truth 
and enforce its determinations as law.  The state is incompetent to determine 
authoritatively what God does or does not command.  At least, that must be 
the operating premise if the right of religious freedom is not to be a chimera.  
And even if that premise must give way in clear, or extreme, cases—because 
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surely there are some claims individuals make about God’s commands that 
are simply intolerably and irredeemably false—a strong presumption of state 
incompetence needs to be the starting point for any coherent system of 
religious freedom from state control or interference.1  Thus, it is 
incompatible with religious liberty for the state to “establish” an official 
religion or in any fashion prescribe, and then coerce, religious exercise. 
Significantly, this is not because we deny the possibility that religious 
truth exists.  Rather, the underlying theory of why we protect religious 
liberty is that such a thing as religious truth does exist.  We value freedom 
for religion because we rightly prioritize true religion over the state’s 
commands. We simply recognize the possibility of human error, and 
especially of governmental error, in matters of religion and so we do not 
trust the state to tell us the proper way to know, worship, and serve God.  
We value freedom for religion precisely because, if society gets these things 
wrong (as experience tells us it is quite likely to do), such errors, where 
backed by the power of the state, will tend to endanger religious truth.  Error 
likes to stamp out truth if it has power to do so.  And error is probable.  
Moreover, even if it were the case that society or the state did know religious 
truth, we would rightly question, on theological as well as practical grounds, 
the value and propriety of coercion in matters of religious conviction.  True 
faith does not result from coercion—or so we are inclined to believe, often 
as a matter of religious faith itself. 
Thus we protect the free exercise of religion for all (or as many as 
possible) and prohibit the establishment of any—not because of skepticism 
about the possibility of religious truth but because of the conviction that 
religious truth is a possibility and because of an agreement that such truth is 
more important than anything else.  We are skeptical not about truth, but 
about human perceptions of it and especially about state authority to discern 
or prescribe it. 
My thesis is that this is, in its essence, the theory underlying and 
justifying the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and that they should 
be read, understood, and applied in this light. The First Amendment’s 
religious liberty provisions make no sense except on the supposition that 
God exists—that such a thing as religious truth exists and that the commands 
of true religious faith are real and superior to the commands of civil society.  
The framing generation, I submit, generally shared the supposition that God 
exists and generally shared this understanding of what religious liberty is 
 1.  See infra notes 4345 and accompanying text. 
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for.  They disagreed, widely and not always cheerfully, about the nature and 
character of God, the manner and content of God’s revelation, and resulting 
human obligations and right conduct.  But that is part of why that generation 
came to agree on the idea of religious freedom.2  
The language of the Religion Clauses appears to reflect such an 
understanding—that is, the First Amendment’s terms seem to reflect quite 
well the essentially religious premises underlying any serious commitment 
to the idea of religious liberty.  The Free Exercise Clause is properly 
understood as conferring broad substantive immunity from government laws 
or regulations that would operate to prohibit sincere religious belief and 
exercise.  As long as a claimed religious practice is truly religious, not 
pretextual, and has any plausible claim to religious truth—that is, as long as 
the claimed religious right is not contrary to the clear, universal moral 
command of God, resulting in serious harms outside the truly consenting, 
sincerely confessing community of faith—the state’s rule must yield in the 
specific instance.3  The Establishment Clause is properly understood as 
barring government from compelling religious belief or exercise or 
punishing failure to adhere to a state-prescribed religious orthodoxy.  It 
protects the free non-exercise of religion, just as the Free Exercise Clause 
protects its free exercise.4  The two clauses protect the same central liberty, 
from two slightly different directions: the Establishment Clause forbids 
government prescription of religious exercise; the Free Exercise Clause 
forbids government proscription of religious exercise.5 
 2.  See infra notes 5051 and accompanying text. 
 3.  See infra notes 4245 and accompanying text. 
 4.  See infra notes 15758 and accompanying text. 
 5.  This position (and in some respects even the verbal formulation) is one I have advanced 
before in other writing.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense 
of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1609–10, 1611–25 (1997) [hereinafter 
Making Sense of Religious Freedom] (reviewing JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 
(1996)) (comprehensively discussing, primarily, the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993) [hereinafter Paulsen, Lemon 
is Dead] (discussing, primarily, the meaning of the Establishment Clause and defending the 
proposition that the clause prohibits government coercion to engage in religious exercise, worship, 
affirmation, or direct support of a religious institution); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA 
Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995) [hereinafter 
Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It] (discussing the question of what “interests” of a state should 
prevail over legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, 
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause 
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986) [hereinafter Paulsen, Equal Protection 
Approach] (asserting view that the Establishment Clause is properly understood as equally 
protecting the freedom not to exercise religion).  In this essay, I build on ideas presented in these 
articles and refine and modify some of them.  In doing so, I have sometimes taken the liberty of 
closely paraphrasing formulations I have used before.  I have endeavored not to overburden the text 
with too many direct quotation marks and at the same time not to depart greatly from prior 
formulations of propositions except where I really do intend a refinement (or repudiation).  The 
result is a certain amount of borderline-self-plagiarism, for which I hereby apologize—and which 
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I began by saying that religious liberty only makes entire sense on the 
basis of these essentially religious premises about the existence of God and 
the priority of God’s commands.  It is possible to craft a narrower, more 
crabbed conception of religious liberty on different, more-or-less “secular” 
premises.  But such conceptions, while in some respects more intuitively 
appealing to the modern liberal mind, have less explanatory power both in 
terms of why we would have—why the framing generation would have 
insisted upon—a specific First Amendment protection for the free exercise 
of religion and in terms of what that provision actually says.  Secular 
theories of religious liberty are weaker theories and harder to defend on 
principle.6 
But there are such possible theories and one of the first inquiries in 
seeking a full understanding of the Religion Clauses is to sketch the range of 
possible societal stances toward religious liberty and to identify and locate 
the conception that the First Amendment seems best to match.  Part II of this 
essay identifies four general stances toward religious freedom, gridded by 
different views as to whether they proceed from the premise that religious 
truth exists and different views as to whether one should be tolerant or 
intolerant of individual (and group) departures from society’s general answer 
to this question.7  Part III stakes the claim that the First Amendment Religion 
Clauses fit into the general stance of strong toleration of individual claims to 
religious free exercise because of a belief in the reality and possibility of 
religious truth and liberal skepticism about the capacity of the state to 
identify and prescribe such truth.  The model for understanding the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, then, is “Freedom For Religion”—
protection of religious freedom because of the belief that religion is 
intrinsically important and that knowledge and worship of God, and 
obedience to God’s commands and expectations, is in principle more 
important than anything government or society might say.  Part IV discusses 
this general footnote hopefully mitigates to the extent necessary by attributing the original sources in 
which some of these ideas were first presented. 
 6.  For extended discussion of this point, see Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 
supra note 5, at 1162–63. 
 7.  See infra Part II.  In the course of that discussion, I also briefly consider the position of 
radical agnosticism, a variation that purports not to know (and sometimes claims it is not possible to 
know) whether or not religious truth exists.  I believe that this position tends to collapse either into a 
position that credits the possibility of religious truth and concedes its (theoretical) priority over the 
commands of the State or (more often, perhaps) into a position of such complete radical skepticism 
of religious claims as to amount to disbelief and thus unwillingness to grant religious conduct 
priority over society’s usual commands.  Agnosticism thus tends to tip into either my second or third 
categories described below.  See infra note 9. 
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how this model might help illumine understanding of the language of the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause, and 
guide its faithful application. In particular, it helps explain why the First 
Amendment, properly construed, protects only the free exercise of religion 
and not analogous claims of secular conscience and conduct, no matter how 
similar in form or sympathetic; why it protects such free exercise even from 
facially neutral laws; and why and how religious premises may help identify 
the bounds, or limits, of cognizable claims of freedom—immunity from state 
authority—for religion. 
II.  FOUR STANCES TOWARD RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
There are fundamentally four types of stances a society, and its 
governmental system, can adopt with respect to the relationship between 
state authority and religious exercise.  The first two proceed from a society’s 
general understanding that religious truth exists, but fork off in different 
directions depending on views about the role of the state in defining and 
enforcing religious truth.  The first view thinks the state can know what 
religious truth is and should enforce it; the second thinks the state is not 
competent to judge such matters and should tolerate, even embrace, private 
freedom to decide and act on views that may differ from a society’s general 
view of what religious truth is. 
The third and fourth stances proceed from a society’s general view that 
religious truth does not exist, but take different positions as to what stance 
the state should take with respect to persons or groups who nonetheless 
believe in religious truth.  The third view tolerates beliefs and to some extent 
conduct at variance with the non-religious general views of society; the 
fourth view tends to regard most any religious conduct at variance with 
society’s laws as unjustified and unacceptable. 
The four stances usefully can be arranged in a crudely chronological 
fashion from a “pre-liberal” stance of religious intolerance (because of a 
belief in religious truth), to a “liberal” stance of religious tolerance (because 
of a belief in religious truth), to a “modern” stance of religious tolerance 
(despite a disbelief in religious truth), and finally to a “post-modern” stance 
of religious intolerance (because of a disbelief in religious truth).  The labels 
are imperfect8 and the lines between categories often blurred.  But, painting 
 8.  In prior writing, I have sometimes used the term “liberal” to describe what I here dub 
“modern.”  Both labels are imperfect.  My intention here is to distinguish between classical liberal 
understandings of the reasons for protecting religious liberty that were dominant in the eighteenth 
and at least early nineteenth centuries—views influenced by intellectual currents formed by the 
Reformation, Renaissance, Great Awakening, and Enlightenment but that ultimately accept the 
reality of God and the priority of God’s commands over man’s law—and later, twentieth century 
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with a broad brush, the different categories correspond generally to real 
differences in paradigms of the relationship between religious and state 
authority.9 
“modern” understandings of the reasons for religious liberty that purport to depend less (or not at all) 
on whether or not God exists and makes true commands that bind human conscience and conduct. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.A.1–4.  What about a stance of societal religious agnosticism?  Is there a 
possible fifth category, in which society (or the State) is completely agnostic about religious truth 
and derives its approach to religious freedom from such thoroughgoing agnosticism?  On such a 
view, a society might embrace religious freedom because it does not know whether or not there is 
such a thing as religious truth, and (therefore) agrees to provide religious freedom to those who 
assert that there is such a truth and seek to live in accordance with such premises: after all, such 
persons may be right.  (But they also might not be right.) 
  This stance resembles, in different ways, the second and third stances toward religious 
freedom identified in the text.  Like the second strategy, it doubts government’s epistemological 
ability to discern religious truth.  But not merely because it distrusts government: agnosticism doubts 
that there is such a thing as religious truth.  Like the third category, it is willing, in theory, to grant at 
least some degree of religious freedom to religious adherents notwithstanding doubts that God 
exists—doubts that religious conviction corresponds to anything real.  A posture of agnosticism thus 
straddles, to some degree, the two middle positions, embracing aspects of both.  It agrees with the 
idea of religious liberty, not because of belief in God and not despite belief in God but because of 
uncertainty, lack of knowledge, or inherent failure of knowledge.  A society’s belief, or disbelief, in 
God, is, on this view, irrelevant. 
  The key question is whether agnosticism is an unnecessary fifth wheel to my nice two-by-
two grid, or a genuinely independent fifth point of a pentagon.  My sense is that agnosticism tends to 
collapse, analytically, into one or another of the existing categories and thus may fairly be treated as 
a variant of one or the other such categories.  Agnosticism in matters of religion (for individuals, 
certainly, and presumably for a society that is so described) is never, except in pure theory, a 
position of complete equipoise between belief and disbelief.  It leans—in one direction or another. 
  For example, if a society’s agnosticism tilts slightly in the direction of accepting the 
possibility that religious truth exists—and crediting that possibility so far as to concede that if 
religious truth exists, that truth should prevail over any contrary commands of society—it is 
essentially indistinguishable from my second category described below: we should grant broad 
religious freedom to act in ways different from usual secular authority; and we should deny secular 
authority power to prescribe any particular view.  (The State should be, officially, “agnostic.”)  If, on 
the other hand, a society’s general religious agnosticism or skepticism tilts in the opposite direction 
of doubting that religious truth exists, its stance toward religious freedom will more closely 
resemble my third category: it will tend to tolerate religious exercise, to a degree, but doubt whether 
the claims of religion should defeat the claims of society over individual and group conduct.  Even 
more so, such a view doubts that religious claims should ever be preferred over analogous, secular 
ethical claims.  In these respects, the stance of agnosticism very closely resembles the third stance I 
describe—the “modern” view.  It is simply a less-certain-that-God-does-not-exist subcategory within 
that third category and analytically indistinguishable from it.  (This is in fact the direction in which I 
think most positions of agnosticism tend to lean, and fall.  But that is an empirical question about 
which I am . . . agnostic.) 
  Of course, to describe a society as “agnostic” is in some sense as artificial as it is to describe 
a society’s stance as proceeding from a view that God exists or does not exist.  These are analytic 
categories—constructs—far more than descriptions of sociological fact.  (Societies comprise a 
mixture of views.)  From the standpoint of thinking about why and to what degree or in what ways a 
society might protect religious liberty, it is useful to think in terms of such analytic constructs.  My 
point here is that it is unclear that the category of religious agnosticism is a usefully distinct analytic 
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A.  Religious Intolerance out of Religious Conviction: The “Pre-Liberal” 
Stance 
The first possibility is that a society believes that religious truth exists 
and that society and the (religious) state know what that truth is and 
therefore should not tolerate contrary positions.  The logic behind such a 
position is that if one is fully convinced both that God exists and that one 
knows precisely what God commands, requires, or expects (and if there is 
broad agreement within society on these points), toleration of dissent is 
toleration of grave, destructive, and fundamental moral error—harmful both 
to the individuals concerned and society at large.  To allow dissenting 
conduct, or even dissenting expression, is (on this view) inconsistent with 
the premise that religious truth exists and we know of what that truth 
consists.  Why tolerate error on these most fundamental of things?  More 
than that, the conduct and stance of the state and of society as a whole 
should reflect the known, agreed understanding of God’s will. 
The consequence of such a “pre-liberal” view is that there is no room for 
freedom of religious exercise at variance with the commands of the state.  
There is not, and should not be, any “free exercise” of religion in this strong 
sense.  Nor, even, should religious dissent be tolerated.  Furthermore, it 
makes entire sense to prescribe by law what religious beliefs should be 
official, conform all state policy to such beliefs, and prescribe their 
observance.  The pre-liberal view logically embraces, in short, an 
“established” religion, prescribed by the state and enforced upon all subjects 
or citizens of the state.  Its hallmarks are state prescription and state coercion 
in matters of religion. 
One readily recognizes in this stance the views that led to religious 
conflicts and wars in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere for centuries.  
These views formed part of the European history against which the 
quintessentially American view of religious liberty was reacting, and from 
which many European-Americans were fleeing in the century preceding 
American independence.10  One can also recognize in this stance the views 
category for thinking about why and how a society might constitutionally protect religious freedom.  
Recognizing and respecting the possibility of a contrary view, I nonetheless will treat agnosticism 
not as a separate category but will fold it into the discussion of my second and third categories of 
societal stances toward religious freedom. 
  I am indebted to comments from, and conversations with, John Nagle and Robert Delahunty 
for helping me clarify my thinking on this point. 
 10.  Of course, as soon as religious dissenters fleeing oppressive pre-liberal, state-religion 
European regimes reached America, some of them replicated the pre-liberal pattern in their new 
communities.  This led religious dissenters in the American colonies to flee pre-liberal, state-religion 
American regimes.  This history, too, formed part of the American experience leading to an eventual 
reaction against such arrangements.  For excellent historical treatments, see JOHN M. BARRY, ROGER 
WILLIAMS AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN SOUL (2012); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST 
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that form various radical Islamist movements even today, and some 
fundamentalist strands of other religions.11  The pre-liberal view obviously is 
not dead; it persists in many areas of the globe and in certain religious 
communities.12  It proceeds from a sincere conviction of religious truth, and 
it insists, as a result of that conviction, that falsity—all that does not conform 
to the religious truth so identified—be defeated, repudiated, extirpated, 
overcome, or killed. 
This view believes in what I would call “The Priority of God” and 
shares that belief with the liberal stance that I discuss next: God’s 
requirements and expectations are more important than any contrary human 
commands.  The difference is that the pre-liberal view believes that society, 
and the state, reliably know what God’s requirements and expectations are 
and that it is proper for the state to impose those commands as its human 
commands, enforce conformity to them, and obliterate (to the extent 
possible) dissent. 
B.  Religious Tolerance out of Religious Conviction: The “Liberal” Stance 
The second possibility—and the one I ultimately conclude is the 
American constitutional stance—is that a society believes that religious truth 
exists but that society and the state do not reliably know what constitutes 
true religion, and thus cannot be trusted to get these things right.  The state is 
“liberal” (in an Enlightenment, seventeenth and eighteenth century sense of 
the term) in that it embraces individual liberty on such matters.  The state is 
neutral, or at least tolerant, but not necessarily agnostic in matters of 
religion.13 
The state embraces religious liberty, on this view, not because society 
disbelieves in the possibility of religious truth, but precisely because it 
believes in the possibility of religious truth.  Society merely disbelieves in 
state authority over religion and does not share the (naïve) intuition that 
whatever a majority might believe in matters of religion is therefore the 
FREEDOM: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); 
MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965). 
 11.  For excellent treatments of radical Islamism, see MARY HABECK, KNOWING THE ENEMY: 
JIHADIST IDEOLOGY AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2006); LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING 
TOWER: AL QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11 (2006); see also WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, JUSTICE AND 
THE ENEMY: NUREMBERG, 9/11, AND THE TRIAL OF KHALID SHEIK MOHAMMED, 40–52 (2011). 
 12.  See sources cited supra note 11. 
 13.  The State, or society, might in fact be agnostic about religion, in the sense of not knowing 
whether religious truth exists, but still accepting the possibility of such truth.  See supra note 9.  
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correct understanding of religion.  The people share a pervasive conviction 
of religious truth and in the priority of God’s commands over man’s but, 
often as a result of this same conviction, they also share a pervasive distrust 
of state authority to prescribe religious truth.  After all, if the idea is that 
God’s commands are prior to and superior to any obligations imposed by the 
state—in the words of the disciple Peter, recorded in the book of Acts, “We 
must obey God, not men”14—on what reasoning can it be accepted that the 
state (peopled by “men” and not necessarily good ones) necessarily has the 
right ideas about what God commands?  The very idea of state authority to 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of religious belief and conduct is 
inconsistent with the premise of the priority of God and God’s commands 
over those of any mere human authority. 
Unless, that is, one assumes that the state always perfectly reflects the 
priorities of God in its decisions, actions, and requirements.  Liberal 
societies, in their stance toward religious freedom, of course reject any such 
assumption.  In part, that rejection is based on those societies’ lived 
experiences and histories—they have seen governments that thought they 
knew religious truth, had it wrong (in the view of many), and oppressed 
dissenters who probably had it (more) right.  America was settled in part by 
people fleeing such governments.  In part, the rejection of state competence 
is based on liberal societies’ theologies—their religious premises.  There is 
much in Christianity, for example (and in many strands of Judaism), the 
overwhelmingly dominant religious stance of early America, that leads to 
skepticism about the necessary correctness of everything and anything the 
state decides and prescribes.  The state may be right in its action and it may 
be wrong.  And that observation surely extends to the state’s religious 
views.15 
More than that, the liberal view holds that worship of God, and 
obedience to God’s commands, is a “natural right”—one of those 
fundamental rights of man that precedes the social compact and is never 
superseded by it.16  Again, this flows in substantial part from religious 
 14.  Acts 5:29 (Today’s English Version). 
 15.  See generally Acts 5:27–29 (Today’s English Version); JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE 
CHRISTIAN RELIGION 675–76 (Henry Beveridge trans., Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ’g Co. 1989) (1536) 
(“We are subject to the men who rule over us, but subject only in the Lord.”); DIETRICH 
BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP 262–63 (R.H. Fuller & Irmgard Booth trans., Simon & 
Schuster 1995) (1937) (“[T]he sovereign power belongs to God and not to the State”).  Compare 
Romans 13:1 (Today’s English Version) (“Everyone must obey the state authorities, because no 
authority exists without God’s permission, and the existing authorities have been put there by 
God.”).  However Romans 13 is properly understood concerning the relationship between Christians 
and the secular authority of governments, the passage certainly cannot be read as standing for the 
view that secular government has authority to determine religious truth.  
 16.  See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (“All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship 
Almighty God.”). 
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conviction about the priority of God and of God’s commands.  People might 
surrender some of their state-of-nature liberty in order to form a collective, 
civilized society that protects other types of rights against interference from 
private violence by the predatory strong at the expense of the innocent weak.  
But the right to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own 
conscience is not a right that is ever justifiably surrendered to society and the 
state.  That is because God exists and has a prior and always superior claim 
on human loyalty.  The state acts legitimately only when it honors those 
prior claims of God. 
Thus, the liberal stance is that, while religious truth exists, that does not 
mean the state can decide what it is.  Individuals, and private groups, get to 
decide what it is, and have the right—the natural right—to act in accordance 
with their sincere conviction as to what that truth is.  Freedom of religion, 
within such a society, is the collective embrace of the correctness of this 
proposition.  It is the state’s acknowledgement, in its fundamental 
constitution of government, that it is not the supreme authority in this 
respect; God is.  This means that the state must yield to private religious 
conscience, at least in the absence of some reasonably certain demonstration 
that the claim of religious conviction is insincere, not really religious, or 
harmfully outside the bounds of anything that plausibly could be thought the 
true command of God—not really the true “exercise of religion” in any 
plausibly recognizable, legitimate sense.  (I will have more to say about this 
below: the collective conviction that there is such a thing as religious truth 
establishes boundaries, in extreme cases, on the claims that may be made in 
the name of God or religious conviction.  In the end, I believe this is the only 
fully convincing rationale for what Free Exercise Clause doctrine has 
sometimes recognized as “compelling state interest” overrides of 
presumptive claims for religious autonomy.17) 
Under the liberal view, because the state is not supreme, the state must 
yield to the legitimate free exercise of religion.  And because the state is not 
supreme, it may not prescribe and compel adherence to, or coerce, religious 
observance—it must respect the non-exercise of any particular religion, as a 
corollary aspect of true religious freedom.  The consequence is “dis-
establishment” of religion and broad freedom for religious exercise and non-
exercise—religious freedom because society believes in God, believes in 
religious truth, and believes that such truth can only survive, thrive, and 
prevail in an atmosphere of religious liberty.   
 17.  See infra pp. 1210–11. 
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Such religious liberty can come in weak and in strong variations.  The 
Lockean and early American concept of religious “toleration” is a weaker 
version of religious freedom than is the later, constitutional concept of “free 
exercise.”18  Within either variation, there are difficult instances of 
application on the margins—questions that I explore briefly below.  But the 
fundamental liberal paradigm of constitutional religious liberty is that the 
state recognizes and protects religious liberty as a natural right, out of an 
essentially religious acknowledgement that God’s authority categorically 
prevails over the state’s. 
C.  Religious Tolerance out of the Conviction that Religious Truth Does Not 
Exist: The “Modern” View of Rational Skepticism 
A third possible stance is religious tolerance even where society does 
not believe in the possibility or reality of religious truth or is deeply 
skeptical about such claims.  Religious truth does not exist, in this view, but 
religion nonetheless should be tolerated, and its free exercise indulged or 
permitted, at least within reasonable bounds.  I call this the “modern” view, 
a label that seeks to capture, however imprecisely, its somewhat “post-
liberal” character, its relative recentness, and its broader twentieth century 
perspective of rationalism and skepticism.  It is distinguishable from the 
liberal view in its attitude toward religion: it is a post-religious, agnostic, 
secularist view of reality.  It succeeds to the liberal view’s skepticism about 
government’s capacity to identify truth in matters of religion, and to its 
skepticism about the legitimacy of government power over matters of 
individual liberty and choice generally.  But unlike the liberal view of 
religious freedom, the modern view is skeptical about religious truth claims 
generally, not just government power. 
On this view, we protect religious liberty not because religion is 
fundamentally important—not because we believe God exists and makes 
claims on humans that are of prior and superior obligation to those of the 
state; God either does not exist or does not really make such claims.  Rather, 
we protect religious liberty because many people continue to hold such 
beliefs and it is consistent with the modern idea of individual autonomy to 
allow different people to believe different things, and to the extent 
practicable and sensible, to allow people to live and act autonomously on the 
basis of their different belief systems.  Under this view, all sets of beliefs, 
religious or not, are equally tolerable.  None is to be preferred by the state 
over any other.  Freedom and individual autonomy are, in general, valuable 
ideals and should be furthered by state policy.  This holds true with respect 
 18.  See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 1689), 
available at http://www.constitution.org/jl/tolerate.htm.  
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to religion the same as anything else—and not any more so.  At root, there is 
nothing special about religious beliefs.  The modern view scrunches up its 
forehead at the oddness of a phrase like “The Priority of God.” 
If the liberal view is, as I think, the original American constitutional 
view embodied in the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, the modern 
view is the late-twentieth century and early twenty-first century dominant 
American cultural understanding of religious freedom, and the one that 
increasingly has come to be embodied in Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the Religion Clauses.19  “Religious freedom” is not about the 
priority of God’s claims over Man’s.  Religious freedom is, rather, society’s 
and the state’s gently condescending indulgence of the fact that certain 
benighted people continue to take the notion of religion seriously and that it 
is not very nice, or very important, for the state to suppress such views.  To 
be sure, the First Amendment contains distinct religious freedom provisions 
that appear to have treated religious freedom in particular as its own kind of 
special right, but the modern attitude is almost one of viewing the First 
Amendment’s protection of religion as akin to “historic preservation” of 
something quaint.  The only way to make sense of such a constitutional 
provision today is to broaden it to reflect the equality of all belief systems.  
Belief in God is a particular form of belief and people should generally have 
freedom to believe what they want to believe. 
This view accepts the idea of religious freedom, but without the 
religious premises that (at least initially) gave it life and depth.  It leads, 
naturally, to a weaker, less robust conception of religious freedom, for the 
simple reason that the underlying justification for such freedom is weaker.  
Religious freedom, on this view, makes sense for the same reasons that 
society protects individual freedom and autonomy generally: it is nice, good, 
liberal, and tolerant.  The obvious weakness here, on which I elaborate 
below, is that such a justification does little to support religious freedom 
specifically.20 
Religious freedom, on this view, also makes sense, to a certain extent, as 
a neo-Hobbesian “truce,” imposed by the state, to avoid the strife occasioned 
 19.  Mapping this intuition onto the pattern of Supreme Court Religion Clause decisions of the 
past sixty years or so would be a fascinating (if exhausting) project, which I do not wish to undertake 
here.  I leave it as an intuition, formed from a general sense of the “look” of fifty to seventy years, 
standing back a good distance from the painting created by the patterns of individual decisions.  I 
invite the reader to adopt a similar perspective and see if the intuition matches with his or her own. 
 20.  I develop this view at length in Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, 
at 1600–04, building on important insights first suggested to me by a chapter in John Garvey’s 
excellent book, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR?, cited supra at note 5. 
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by religious sects competing for social and political dominance over one 
another, each motivated by its own competing vision of religious truth.21  
The weakness here is that such a justification is a most incomplete 
explanation for religious liberty: it at most justifies a prohibition on 
government establishment and coercion of official religious views and 
conduct.  (Perhaps there will be no religious wars if the rules are that no sect 
can win the game and dominate or exterminate the others even if they win; 
all must be allowed to exist in freedom.)  But it does not do much to justify a 
generous conception of the free exercise of religion: one could enforce 
religious peace by establishing none and suppressing all, too, as long as one 
had the resources, will, and inclination to suppress religion (rather than to 
protect its irritating free exercise).22 
The practical doctrinal consequences of the “modern” posture, for First 
Amendment law, are as follows.  First, there certainly should be no 
establishment of religion or anything at all like an establishment; indeed, to 
treat religious beliefs and exercise differently from secular beliefs and 
conduct begins to take on the feel of an unjustifiable establishment of 
religion.  Why, after all, would it be at all sensible for religion to be treated 
preferably to anything else?  Religious faith does not, from a secularist 
standpoint, really correspond to anything objectively real and of superior 
obligation.  (God does not exist, at least not in the sense of traditional 
religions’ conceptions of God.)  There is thus nothing special about religious 
beliefs in particular, as opposed to any other set of strongly held personal 
beliefs.  It is merely one belief set that people may hold.  There’s nothing 
wrong with that, on the modern view, but there’s nothing wrong with any 
other such belief sets and—this is the crucial shift—it is improper to treat 
competing belief–sets and worldview paradigms differently.  That is part of 
what “no establishment of religion” means—at least when viewed through 
modernist eyes.  Non-establishment, on the modern view, tends strongly in 
the direction of a more thoroughgoing secular relativism. 
A second, related consequence of the modern view is that the Free 
Exercise Clause becomes hard to accept as requiring special accommodation 
of religion in particular in the form of exemption, or immunity, from the 
usual rules of civil society.  Freedom of belief is fine—if embraced across 
 21.  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 257–67 (Forgotten Books 2008) (1651) (noting that a 
Christian monarch ought to determine what constitutes the law of God, and that such matters should 
not be left to the separate determination of different Christian sects or of the Pope). 
 22.  I develop this argument in earlier writing as well.  Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious 
Freedom, supra note 5, at 1604–09.  Indeed, one might even establish religious peace by 
establishing official religious views and policy, and enforcing the establishment orthodoxy with 
ruthless efficiency and state coercive power.  That actually was Thomas Hobbes’s view.  See 
HOBBES, supra note 21, at 381 (concluding that Christian sovereigns have absolute power over their 
subjects’ religion and may “make such laws as themselves shall judge fittest”). 
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the board with respect to all beliefs, religious or not.  That value can be 
assimilated comfortably to the values protected in a similar fashion by 
broad, contemporary notions of the freedom of speech.  As a rule, all speech 
must be treated alike, regardless of its content or viewpoint: “There is an 
equality of status in the field of ideas.”23 
But it is hard to justify the free exercise of religious beliefs that in any 
way seriously conflict with the usual norms of society, under the modern 
stance.  Why tolerate religion,24 in this strong sense of exempting religious 
practice from certain of the rules that govern everyone else?  On the 
premises of the modern view, God does not really exist; “God” does not 
really make commands of loyalty and obedience that constrain human 
behavior.  Religious belief is just a choice that people make, a preference 
like any other.  To borrow Stephen Carter’s memorable phrase, the modern 
view tends to regard “God as a hobby” some people happen to have 
chosen.25  It is fine for the state to accommodate, even indulge, its citizens’ 
hobbies, at least to some extent and if the free exercise of such hobbies does 
not impair anything the state otherwise thinks important.  (On the other 
hand, if something is important enough to pass a law about, the state 
probably regards the activity as important enough not to permit hobby-
exceptions.)  But in a situation in which the state ordinarily would not feel 
inclined to accommodate individual’s choices and hobbies as exceptions to 
its rules, there is no good reason to accommodate religious exercise.  It thus 
becomes very hard, on this view—unacceptable really, if one accepts 
broadened, modern no-establishment principles—to embrace any 
proposition that religious exercise must be granted a sphere of autonomy or 
immunity from government regulation broader than any other set of beliefs 
would have in analogous circumstances.  Thus, for example, a religious 
claim to conscientious objection from military service, on the modern view, 
should have no greater purchase than a wholly non-religious secular 
 23.  Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).  There are certain exceptions and 
variations, but this is the usual rule.  For a survey, see PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 950–58 (2010) (“A Map of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech.”).  For a brief 
defense, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1919–
22 (2001).  Religious speech participates fully in the benefits of this general rule.  The religious 
content of speech by private parties, or the religious identity of the speaker or speakers, is not a basis 
for discrimination against such speech.  See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).  This rule, however, 
is sometimes honored in the breach.  See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 24.  See Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2008–2009). 
 25.  STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 23–43 (1993). 
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conscientious objection claim.  The government should grant both of them 
or neither of them.  But it should not treat them differently.26 
Moreover, where circumstances are not precisely analogous—where 
comparable secular claims of autonomy either do not exist or probably 
would be dismissed out of hand (for example, Native American religious 
claims to use otherwise illegal, controlled substances in religious 
ceremonies,27 to unique access to federal forest lands for site-specific 
religious observance,28 or to exemption from endangered species law 
prohibitions on Eagle Feather use29), it becomes hard for the modern view to 
rationalize accommodations of religion that impose anything other than de 
minimis costs on others, or that occasion any measurable degree of 
administrative inconvenience or inefficiency, including the asserted 
inconvenience and inefficiency of making any type of accommodation at all, 
let alone of sorting out genuine religious claims from spurious ones.  
The overall result is a “strong” reading of the Establishment Clause’s 
prohibition as tending to forbid any accommodation of religious exercise, let 
alone special accommodation for religion specifically, and a “weak” reading 
of the Free Exercise Clause as essentially duplicating the protections of the 
Free Speech Clause–freedom of belief, freedom of expression, and no 
discrimination based on religious views or identity—but lacking any 
meaningful punch of its own.  Unless costless, and unless it would be 
granted to non-religious persons on the same terms, religious exercise need 
not and should not be given any immunity from the operation of the usual 
rules adopted by society’s government. 
As noted above, I think this vision is not the vision contemplated by the 
framing generation or embodied in the original meaning of the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment.  But it is an entirely understandable and 
coherent vision, logical on its own terms, if one reads the Religion Clauses 
through “modern” eyes.30  If one has the view (or if the overall society has 
 26.  This is the perspective adopted, in essence, by the series of cases concerning conscientious 
objection to the military draft.  See Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 
1603, 1617–20.  I address this specific issue as an important illustration of the modern perspective 
later in this Article. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 27.  See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 28.  See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 29.  See, e.g., United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 30.  The problem with adopting such a perspective is much like the problem with reading the 
words and phrases of the Constitution to mean things they did not mean at the time written and 
adopted: it is anachronistic.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its 
Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 875–77 (2009).  Just as the meaning of words in an 
authoritative written legal text must be understood in the sense, and in the context, in which they 
would have been understood at the time and in the place where written, the backdrop understanding 
or perspective one brings to reading and applying such a text should attempt to approximate as 
nearly as possible the views and perspectives that readers of the text would have had at the time it 
was written and adopted as constitutional law.  See infra Part III. 
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such a view, or if the governing elites hold such a view) that religious faith 
is simply a subjective, idiosyncratic personal preference that does not 
conform to objective reality, it truly does not make much sense to accord 
religious exercise special treatment or accommodation.  Why would one do 
such a thing?  To the committed atheist, or even the rigorously (and perhaps 
doctrinaire) agnostic, granting religious exercise a special freedom from the 
usual rules of government is awkward, to say the least.  That awkwardness 
then drives the modern interpreter toward a reading of the First 
Amendment’s protection of the right to “the free exercise [of religion]” that 
is as ungenerous, as un-special, as possible given the language.  Viewed 
from an agnostic perspective—the modern stance—religious freedom is an 
odd right, a constitutional “anomaly” to be hedged in on all sides, 
grudgingly acknowledged, and narrowly construed.31  The alternative would 
be madness—allowing every person to be, in the words of Reynolds v. 
United States, the 1879 Supreme Court case upholding a federal statutory 
ban on polygamy, “a law unto himself.”32  The phrase is revealing: God does 
not (really) command a particular claimed religious observance or conduct; 
religious adherents make up these things for themselves.  The modern 
stance, already incipient in the late nineteenth century, is that religious 
exercise is not really obedience to the law of God; it is every man claiming 
the right to be a law unto himself. 
As noted, I think this follows logically from the (often unstated) premise 
of the modern view that God does not really exist and make claims on 
human conduct and loyalty that have priority over the claims of state and 
society.  If the premise is right, the conclusion is right: religious freedom 
really is an odd freedom to have written into the Constitution and ought to 
be construed as narrowly as possible.  Indeed, I would state the proposition 
in bolder terms yet: If God does not exist, religious freedom is a kooky 
enterprise, protecting delusional people’s delusions and their actions 
predicated on such delusions, and giving those delusions priority over the 
general laws of society.  Who would embrace such a thing?  The modern 
 31.  See Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1610–15.  This is the 
view adopted by the Supreme Court in the notable case of Employment Division v. Smith.  See Smith, 
494 U.S. at 886–88 (arguing that a broad Free Exercise Clause right of religious persons “to ignore 
generally applicable laws” would be “a constitutional anomaly” and that, consequently, recognizing 
such a right would be “courting anarchy”).  It is perhaps ironic that this modern view was embraced 
so vigorously by the writer of the majority opinion in Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia, who is himself a 
devout religious believer—a Roman Catholic Christian.  See generally, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen 
& Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia’s Sermonette, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1997).  
 32.  98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879). 
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view, sensibly on its own terms, treats the free exercise of religion as a 
problematic liberty, to be assimilated as nearly as possible to other 
constitutional values (like freedom of speech), not as a sweeping, inalienable 
natural right.  
The modern view is easy enough to understand, and actually shares 
some insights in common with the “liberal” view.  First, even on the liberal 
view, some claims of autonomy, made in the name of God and religion, are 
simply untenable—delusional, demented, insincere, pretextual, or otherwise 
so outside the bounds of what plausibly may be attributed to God as not to 
warrant treatment as part of the genuine exercise of “religion.”  Even on the 
liberal view, then, certain claims of religious freedom lose to society’s rules; 
they do not warrant First Amendment protection as truly involving the free 
exercise of religion.  In the end, I defend this position, which generally goes 
under the heading of “compelling state interests” that trump otherwise valid 
religious claims, as implicit in the essentially religious justification for 
religious freedom: some claims concerning God’s commands we simply can 
judge not to be valid and true and thus fall outside the range of constitutional 
protection.  We tolerate some bogus or bananas claims of religious freedom 
as a prophylactic matter, but at some squeal point we simply reject them as 
implausible. 
Note, however, how disturbingly similar this is (albeit at a somewhat 
different level) to the modern view’s treatment of all religious beliefs, which 
is that none of them corresponds to anything true or real.  The difference is 
that the liberal view starts from the premise that God exists and that there is 
such a thing as true knowledge, belief, and obedience to God’s true 
commands.  There are also some nonsense claims about God and God’s 
commands and some of these may assume the same superficial form as 
genuine religious claims.  This observation follows logically from the view 
that there is such a thing as religious truth; religious truth means that there is 
such a thing as untrue claims made in the name of religion.  The task of a 
religious freedom rule in the liberal view is to protect the former, to the 
maximum extent, without sweeping in too much of the latter.  The modern 
view overlaps with this view to the extent of believing that it is possible to 
identify some religious truth claims as nonsense.  Indeed, the modern view 
starts from the premise that God does not exist and there is no such thing as 
true knowledge, belief, and obedience to God’s true commands.  When push 
comes to shove, it is all nonsense, and the task of a religious freedom rule is 
to protect as little of such nonsense as possible.  The modern view thus takes 
one aspect of the liberal view and runs with it, but in a secular direction 
because of secular cultural premises. 
The second insight shared by the modern view and the liberal view is 
skepticism about the human capacity accurately to discern God’s will.  For 
the liberal view, this skepticism translates into a thoroughgoing distrust of 
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government power either to prescribe religious exercise for all, or to deny 
free exercise of religion contrary to the usual rules.  Folks get God wrong; a 
majority can get God wrong.  And there’s nothing more dangerous to the 
freedom to pursue and exercise true religious knowledge, worship, and 
obedience than the wrong claims of state and society that the majority, or the 
elites, know better what is the truth in matters of religion. 
But the liberal stance’s correct skepticism about the state’s ability to 
discern religious truth—because it is a mere human enterprise and humans 
err—can subtly shade into skepticism generally about anyone’s ability to 
discern religious truth, including the individual’s or the church’s (or other 
religious organization’s).  The modern view takes skepticism and runs with 
it, too.  After all, if we don’t trust the state because we don’t trust human 
authority to perceive correctly the commands or will of God, why should we 
trust any particular human to get it right either?  Skepticism yields more 
skepticism.  If, functionally, as a matter of governance of all, we are of the 
view that human beings cannot be trusted to correctly perceive the will of 
God, why should the whole of society ever defer to an individual’s or 
minority religious community’s views in this regard?  Why is the one 
suddenly more likely to have it right than the many?  Thus, a “soft” modern 
view might well take the view that, even if there might be such a thing as 
true beliefs about God, we cannot trust any individual to discern them 
correctly.  Thus, it makes no sense to exempt such persons (or groups) from 
the general rules of law adopted by the community.  In practical effect, 
individual claims to religious freedom from government’s laws really do 
make the religious adherent “a law unto himself.”  Because we cannot tell 
whether such adherent is correctly perceiving God’s commands or not, we 
have no basis for excusing his conduct, even if we concede the theoretical 
possibility of God making actual commands. 
The difference between the liberal view (religious freedom out of 
religious conviction) and the modern view (religious freedom 
notwithstanding religious disbelief) is in this respect a function of the extent 
of skepticism about the possibility of true religious claims generally and the 
“good faith” (so to speak) of religious persons.  For the Believer, and for a 
society that consists largely of religious believers, there exists the confidence 
that there is such a thing as religious Truth, that this truth is Good, and that 
this Truth does not lead to a vast swath of absurd, society-destructive claims.  
There is, in short, a confidence—a faith—in the ultimate ability to separate 
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the wheat from the chaff (to borrow a well known religious metaphor).33  
And there is an acknowledgement that, to a certain substantial extent, the 
weeds must be permitted to grow along with the wheat, lest the good crop be 
cut down and killed with the weeds.34   
In the modern view, the wheat and the weeds are essentially 
indistinguishable.  There is no “good crop,” really; it’s all a matter of 
individual preferences and beliefs.  When individual preferences can be 
accommodated in general, it’s fine to do so.  But when individual 
preferences need to be overridden, they need to be overridden.  Wheat and 
weeds being indistinguishable, they are either permitted to grow together, or 
where deemed necessary by secular interests, they may both be mowed 
down or ploughed under. 
D.  Religious Intolerance out of the Conviction that Religious Truth Does 
Not Exist: The “Post-Modern” View 
The final stance brings us full circle: religious intolerance, not because 
the state believes in God and wishes to establish the One True Faith and 
suppress all competing notions (the “pre-liberal” view), but religious 
intolerance because the state disbelieves in God and thus has no use for—
and little tolerance of—religious conduct that in any way resists the 
supposedly more rational, sensible norms the state has adopted as the rules 
for governing the society in question.  Once again, this “post-modern” view 
proceeds from and succeeds to some of the views of the preceding, 
“modern” perspective.35  It simply takes that perspective to a more extreme 
conclusion.  Just as the modern view takes the skepticism of the liberal view 
seriously, and runs with it—adding modern doubt about religious truth—the 
post-modern view takes the modern view’s disbelief in God seriously, and 
runs with that view.  Given the weakness of the conception of religious 
liberty justified by the modern view, the post-modern perspective simply 
takes the next logical step, and knocks out the last prop sustaining any 
serious notion of religious liberty.  Given that God does not exist, the 
rationales for religious liberty embraced by the modern view are weak and 
archaic.  It is better to dispense with them altogether and go straight to the 
last page of the story.  God, if He ever existed, is dead.  And gone with him 
is any sensible claim to religious autonomy in contravention of the usual 
norms of secular society. 
This view holds, then, that religious truth does not exist and that it is 
affirmatively harmful to secular society to permit the free exercise of such 
 33.  Matthew 13:24–30 (Today’s English Version). 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  See supra Part II.C. 
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views.  Whether or not such beliefs and their expression must be tolerated as 
an aspect of the freedom of speech, the state always has a legitimate interest 
in suppressing religiously-motivated behaviors in conflict with society’s 
laws and rules, whatever they may be.  The consequence of this view is an 
“establishment” of sorts, not of religion, but of secularism—a thoroughly 
secular state, educational establishment, cultural identity, and system of 
laws.  The free exercise of religion never requires an exemption or immunity 
from any such law.  There may be no “free exercise” at variance with the 
rules of the secular establishment. 
A fair illustration of this post-modern stance toward religious freedom is 
present-day France.  (Several other European democracies appear to 
represent this stance as well.)  France forthrightly embraces the idea of a 
secular state, and reads its constitutional protections of religious liberty in 
this light.36  Recently, France banned the wearing in public of the full-face 
veil, or burqa, by Muslim women.37  The explicit justification for this ban is 
the value of secularism and community (“fraternity”): the burqa, it is said, 
publicly distinguishes one religious community from another, separates that 
community from society at large, and “hides the face” in a way offensive to 
French communal norms.  Occasionally, state interests in security, and in 
prohibiting what some think is improper sexism within a religious 
community, are invoked as well.  But the chief justification for the burqa ban 
remains, simply, secularism and society’s interest in suppression of 
offensive expressions of a distinctive and communal religious identity.38 
 36.  See 1958 CONST. 1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social 
Republic.  It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race 
or religion.”). 
 37.  See Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdissant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace 
public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 on Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 
2010, p. 1; see also Steven Erlanger, France: Full-Face Veil Ban Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/world/europe/08briefs-France.html?r=1&ref=muslim 
veiling. 
 38.  I owe this illustration in part to my participation in a series of public debates in April 2011, 
sponsored by the Federalist Society, at Yale Law School, Brown University, and Harvard Law 
School, between me and distinguished French constitutional lawyer and public figure Mr. Francois-
Henry Briard, concerning France’s burqa ban, which took effect the week of our debates.  I thank 
Mr. Briard for that wonderful opportunity and for a series of enlightening and provocative debates.  
The position I took in the debates was the same one I take here.  I do not mean to disparage France’s 
position—at least not unnecessarily—by characterizing it as one of religious intolerance.  But I do 
disagree with it vigorously, and distinguish it sharply from what I think is the (proper) American 
position as reflected in the original meaning of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
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This stance—one in which essentially any interest that a deliberative 
political majority thinks is important enough to enact into law is sufficient to 
prevail over a contrary claim of religious free exercise—is not one that truly 
values religious liberty in any serious sense of the term.  It contemplates no 
sphere of natural right to engage in religious exercise immune from the 
cognizance of civil government.  The extent of religious freedom is purely a 
function of the degree to which government chooses to grant it.  Government 
may grant such accommodation to religions it thinks harmless to 
communitarian interests and deny accommodation to religions, or specific 
practices, it thinks harmful.  And the range of what constitutes a cognizable 
harm to society, permitting suppression specifically of a religious practice, is 
extraordinarily broad: anything society disapproves of.  This is religious 
freedom in name only—a hollow shell.  It is, to use a mathematics term, the 
“degenerate case” of religious freedom. 
Such an approach in practice resembles most closely the pre-liberal 
approach of religious intolerance, albeit (arguably) in less virulent form.  
The pre-liberal approach is one of religious intolerance, out of a conviction 
that religious truth exists, the state knows what that truth is, and competing 
visions ought not be tolerated.  The religious establishment reigns, and free 
exercise of religion inconsistent with established orthodoxy is forbidden and 
punished.  The post-modern approach is one of religious intolerance, out of a 
conviction that religious truth does not exist; the state embraces that secular 
orthodoxy and competing visions ought not be tolerated.  The secular 
establishment reigns, and free exercise of religion inconsistent with 
established orthodoxy is—again—forbidden and punished. 
Thus the circle is completed.  The evolution of progressively different 
stances toward the notion of religious truth, and freedom to pursue it, yields 
a “progress” in approaches toward religious freedom that, ironically, 
eventually returns to where things started. 
To reprise: First, religious intolerance out of religious conviction yields 
to religious tolerance borne of religious conviction, but coupled with distrust 
of government authority.  The priority of God’s commands over Man’s leads 
no longer to establishment and compulsion, but instead to broader private 
liberty, as belief in religious truth produces a public commitment to private 
freedom to pursue, and act on, what one believes to be religious truth.  The 
freedom to obey God, rather than men, is understood as a natural law right to 
be free from any government interference with sincere religious exercise. 
Next, as society becomes more secular, religious tolerance borne of 
religious faith gradually yields to the religious tolerance of a less religious 
society, rooted less in faith in God than faith in liberty as a generic secular 
proposition.  Religious tolerance becomes a function of secular diversity and 
the perceived value of personal autonomy generally, rather than religious 
conviction specifically.  Religious freedom becomes a narrower, less favored 
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freedom: non-establishment is emphasized; free exercise of religious beliefs 
in particular is harder to sustain when such exercise conflicts with the norms 
of secular society. 
Finally, the residual religious tolerance of a secular modern society 
yields to the religious intolerance of a secular post-modern society, bred of a 
different kind of collective certainty about religious propositions: because 
religious belief and exercise do not reflect anything real, but merely 
capricious (or delusional) personal preference, there is no reason for the 
secular state ever to yield to the exercise of religious convictions.  The 
notion of the priority of God over men is a relic of a bygone age, a legal 
fiction, which, even if it were once the foundational premise of religious 
liberty, is no longer sustainable or sensible.  Free exercise of religion, as a 
specially protected freedom, is an embarrassment.  The priority of the 
secular state—of human society’s law—necessarily trumps any and all mere 
private commitments to false beliefs in a (mythical) God. 
III.  FREEDOM FOR RELIGION: A THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
Which of these four stances provides the correct, or best, perspective for 
understanding and applying the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?  
Which one has the best claim of representing faithfully (so to speak) the 
original public meaning of the religious freedom provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution—the objective linguistic meaning the words and phrases would 
have had, in social and political context, to a reasonably informed speaker 
and reader of the English language, at the time and in the place they were 
adopted? 
That is the task of constitutional interpretation—identifying the original 
public meaning of the language of our written Constitution.39  A critical 
 39.  The task of constitutional interpretation is, as I have argued and defended elsewhere, the 
search for the objective, original public meaning of the authoritative written text of a constitutional 
provision.  See Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra 
note 30; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003) [hereinafter Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive 
Force]; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 291 (2002) [hereinafter Kesavan & Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?].  The question 
of whether one likes or should follow and apply as law the meaning of a constitutional provision is a 
different matter—a hermeneutical issue or political decision.  Interpretation precedes application and 
is a separate enterprise.  See Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own 
Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 910–12, 918–19.  The question of whether to apply the original 
meaning of the text is, I believe, settled by the Constitution’s text, at least for those who have agreed 
to exercise authority under the Constitution and apply it faithfully as law.  See generally id. at 864–
72. 
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aspect of that task is reading the language of the Constitution in context.  To 
read the words of the First Amendment Religion Clauses (or any other 
constitutional provision) accurately and to apply them faithfully, one must 
understand their meaning in the social, political, and linguistic milieu in 
which they were written, and seek to ascertain the meaning they would have 
had within the community in which they were adopted.  Though the 
provisions of the Constitution continue to apply today, as a consequence of 
the explicit or implicit political decision of today’s society to continue to be 
bound by a written Constitution adopted (in the main) many years ago, the 
meaning of those provisions is the objective meaning they had at the time 
written, not the subjective or anachronistic understanding of any person or 
actor today, at variance with that original meaning.40 
To read the Religion Clauses in their original sense, and in context, is an 
effort to faithfully recover their original meaning, not to substitute 
something else for it.  It is a search for original linguistic meaning, not an 
effort to replace it with an imputed “purpose” alien to the words and usages 
of the time.  This is an important distinction.  The task of constitutional 
interpretation is not to identify, or conjure, an abstract “purpose” or 
“principle” “behind” (or “underlying”) a constitutional provision and then 
interpret and apply that purpose or principle rather than the words 
themselves.  That is a familiar trick of legal manipulation: reformulate the 
text as some abstract proposition loosely thought to flow from the text; take 
  Some prominent scholars and theorists of the First Amendment Religion Clauses posit that, 
to be successful, any interpretation of the Religion Clauses must be one that does not require 
acceptance of religious premises—it must be capable of being embraced by believers, atheists, and 
agnostics alike.  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 313, 316–17 (1996).  On this view, an interpretation of the Religion Clauses fails if it 
requires the reader to presuppose either “that religion is a good thing [or] that faith is bad or 
subordinate to reason.”  Id. at 313. 
  With all due respect, Professor Laycock is confusing interpretation (exegesis of the meaning 
of the text) with the “political” decision of what to do with a text—whether and how to appropriate it 
for contemporary use (often called “hermeneutics”).  Laycock’s proposition is a political one—an 
argument about what kinds of interpretations are or should be politically acceptable and sustainable.  
But that should be irrelevant to the question of the original meaning and proper understanding—the 
correct interpretation—of constitutional language.  As I have explained in previous writing, an 
interpretation need not be “successful” (in this political sense) to be correct as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation: 
[I]t need only be sound as a matter of straightforward, non-result driven, textual 
interpretation in accordance with the ordinary, common public meaning of the language 
employed at the time it was adopted and contemporaneous evidence of the original 
understanding and purpose of the provision.  The political task should be to persuade 
those who find the resulting interpretation unacceptable as a policy matter nonetheless to 
accept it as a matter of constitutional law, not to contrive an interpretation to suit those 
who may dislike a provision’s natural and intended meaning. 
Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 12, at 1613–14 n.39. 
 40.  Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30, 
at 858–59, 872–82. 
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that proposition and expound (or expand) upon it; then read that proposition 
back into the text, substituting the (reformulated) abstract principle for the 
actual, original linguistic meaning of the text itself, thereby changing (or 
shading) the meaning of the text.41  That, to repeat, is to play tricks with the 
text; and that is emphatically not the point of seeking to understand a text’s 
context. 
The point rather, is that correctly understanding the original public 
meaning of a constitutional text requires reading its words in their original 
sense and context and avoiding anachronistic readings produced by an 
interpreter’s unwitting tendency to read the text through later, modern (or 
post-modern) eyes.  Original-meaning textualism requires reading texts in 
their original sense.  That entails embracing, to a certain extent, the general 
worldview and premises of the time and place in which they were written 
and adopted as part of the Constitution, even if such a worldview and 
premises are not ones common to today. 
Through whose eyes, then, should we read the words of the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses?  To the extent that the First Amendment’s 
language reflects a worldview under which religious liberty was understood 
as a “natural right”—a theological proposition about the origin and nature of 
certain rights as being bestowed by God—or an “inalienable right”—a 
proposition of political theory concerning absolute or categorical limitations 
on the power of the state with respect to rights of such description—that 
understanding is highly relevant to correct interpretation and application of 
the Religion Clauses.  It does not substitute for the text; rather, it assists 
faithful interpretation of the text, illuminating the meaning of its words and 
concepts (like “free exercise,” “religion,” and “establishment”) and helping 
resolve possible ambiguity. 
My proposition is that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment 
reflect the second of the views identified above (the one I call the “liberal” 
view).  They reflect an essentially religious proposition about the possibility 
of religious truth and the priority of God’s real commands over the contrary 
requirements of human authority.  They emerged from a social, religious, 
and political context that regarded religious freedom, within the broad 
bounds of plausibly true claims about God, as a natural and inalienable 
right—a God-given sphere of liberty over which the state has no proper 
jurisdiction.  The Religion Clauses reflected broad political recognition too, 
of the proposition that duties to God are superior to duties to the state and 
 41.  Id. at 878–79 (describing this as “Lawyers’ Tricks 101” and identifying specific practices 
and practitioners fitting the description). 
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that the state does not necessarily and reliably reflect God’s will.  Such a 
theory of the Religion Clauses, I submit, better explains the presence of 
these provisions in the Constitution than does any competing theory, and 
also sheds light on perennial questions about how they should be interpreted 
and applied.  In short, understanding religious freedom under the First 
Amendment as an inalienable natural right of individuals and groups to act 
in sincere obedience to God’s commands, rather than submit to man’s 
authority, makes more coherent sense of the Religion Clauses—their text, 
their history, their underlying logic and structure—than does any other 
view.42 
It follows that, in a contest between the dictates of faith and the usual 
dictates of law, the First Amendment’s very strong presumption is that it is 
the law that ordinarily must yield.  That was certainly the dominant, 
eighteenth century American view of the priority and obligations of religious 
faith: where in conflict, God’s commands trump Man’s.43  More to the point, 
the dominant eighteenth century constitutional view was that the state is 
obliged to acknowledge the correctness, in principle, of this description of 
priorities: for the state, as well as for the church, God’s commands trump 
Man’s.  Accordingly, the First Amendment “prefer[s] the sincere 
individual’s claim of religious conscience to the government’s claim of 
secular authority, absent an extraordinary showing of insincere religion or of 
a threat to state interests of the highest order.”44  (And, as I develop below, 
the “state interests” that should count as sufficient to prevail over religious 
liberty reflect essentially religious premises as well: they more or less track 
the set of extreme circumstances in which we are prepared to say, in effect, 
that the claim of religious obligation is simply not a true religious claim—
that God did not and does not command or endorse the religious claimant’s 
conduct.45) 
 42.  As I have written elsewhere: 
[T]he religion clauses . . . entail a series of essentially religious premises: God exists; 
God makes claims on the loyalty of human beings; these claims sometimes require action 
that may conflict with government regulation; the claims of God are, for the individual 
believer, prior to and superior in obligation to the claims of the state; and—this is the 
crucial point—even from the state’s perspective the claims of the state ordinarily should 
yield to the claims of God, as sincerely articulated by the religious believer, because the 
claims of God rightfully have a stronger claim on human loyalty than do the claims of the 
state. . . .  The law thinks that God exists and that He makes demands (rules, duties, 
prohibitions) on men, and that this reality requires the state to yield. 
Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1611. 
 43.  Acts 5:29 (Today’s English Version). 
 44.  Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1610. 
 45.  More on this presently, in Part IV’s discussion of how these general propositions about the 
meaning of the Religion Clauses map onto questions of interpretation of the specific phrases of those 
clauses.  See infra Part IV. 
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Except on these essentially religious premises about the reality and 
priority of God, the Free Exercise Clause really makes no sense.  Assume for 
a moment that there is no God—the stance of the third and fourth positions 
discussed above.  Why on earth would you want to protect religious liberty?  
There are perhaps some “soft” reasons: other things being equal, it is nice to 
let people act in accordance with their (non-harmful) beliefs whenever 
possible, even if one thinks them silly or misguided.46  Granting a sphere of 
religious freedom might lessen religious conflict and thereby promote public 
peace.  Finally, religious belief, even if not justified as true belief, still might 
be useful to society, because religious people tend to be good people. 
But as noted above (and in my other writing), these arguments do not 
provide a sufficient justification for affirmatively protecting the free exercise 
of religion in particular, and seemingly none at all for strong protection of 
free exercise in the form of exemption of religious conduct from the usual 
rules society has seen fit to adopt for its governance.  If letting people act on 
their beliefs is, generally, a good and nice thing, it is hard to justify religious 
liberty specifically as opposed to “liberty” in general—the “free exercise” of 
everything.  The argument is one for libertarianism, not religious freedom.  
After all, what’s so special about religion, if it has no special claim to stating 
likely ultimate truth, superior in importance to anything the state requires?  
What’s so special about religion, if religious devotion is essentially 
indistinguishable from anything else an individual believes, desires, or is 
committed to?  What justifies religious liberty if the conflicting claim of 
conscience, for a religious person, is no different in principle from any other 
claim of non-religious conscience?  Put more strongly yet: if religion is in 
reality delusional, or simply the projection of the individual’s own views 
onto a “God” of some sort, why specially protect such delusion?  Indeed, 
wouldn’t one want to protect it less strongly than non-delusional secular 
personal philosophies or strongly held individual views about reality, 
society, or politics? 
The indulgence of religion as a quaint and good thing quickly runs out 
of gas.  Why would one ever allow religious claims to prevail over the rules 
of society that were otherwise thought good and important rules?  Religious 
people might (generally) be good people, worthy of respect, but that 
justification lacks legs.  Why, on such a view, would one ever allow 
 46.  One variation of this, suggested by my designated interlocutor at the conference where this 
Article was presented in draft form, Professor Eugene Volokh, is that society as a whole tends to 
respect people who hold intense, principled commitments and that religious commitments are often 
of such a nature. 
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religious people to do things one thought were not good?  Religious liberty 
thus becomes a theory of allowing religious people to act in conformity with 
the state’s laws and rules—freedom to do things that society already thinks 
good and proper.  Nobody needs a Free Exercise Clause for that.  
Presumably, the religious adherent’s conduct has not, in such a situation, 
brought him into conflict with society’s rules.  A theory of religious liberty 
sufficient to explain the inclusion of the Free Exercise Clause in the 
Constitution requires some rationale for the decision to disempower 
government of its usual powers.  While it is not impossible that the Framers 
might have written the Free Exercise Clause merely as a way of forbidding 
discrimination of religion and protecting the right of religious persons to act 
in conformity with laws to which they have no objection, this is a rather 
weak explanation for the provision as written.  It is even harder to swallow 
the proposition that the Framers crafted a provision specifically concerning 
toleration of religion more for the sake of tolerance in general than for the 
sake of religion in particular. 
Finally, as for the idea that religious liberty tends to preserve peace on 
earth and goodwill toward all, it is not clear why permitting free exercise of 
religion is the right route to such an objective.  Exercise of religion—actions 
motivated by religion—is precisely the sort of thing that tends to cause 
friction in society.  Why would one want to protect such conduct if one’s 
goal was to keep the peace?47  Wouldn’t it make more sense to protect 
simply freedom of belief but not necessarily its exercise?  If public peace is 
the justification for religious liberty, then certainly one would not wish to 
protect any conduct at variance with society’s laws.  Permitting free exercise 
of religion at variance with the norms of society simply makes no sense from 
a keeping-the-peace perspective.  And to the extent one is concerned to keep 
any religion from waging war on the others, why not just have an 
Establishment Clause barring any winner-takes-all rewards for any religion, 
and then enforce neutral laws against harm to others?  That would probably 
be enough to give one religious peace.  Who needs the Free Exercise 
Clause?  It just mucks things up by arguably permitting some obstreperous 
conduct.  And if “free exercise” of religion were thought to embrace only 
things like choice of prayer books, rituals, and church structure, organization 
and leadership, the term seems an exceedingly poor choice of words.  Why 
not then have used the term “freedom of worship”? 
The third stance—religious tolerance notwithstanding a culture of 
disbelief—does not well explain, or justify, the inclusion of the Religion 
Clauses in our Constitution.  Nor does it cohere very well with the language 
of the provisions themselves.  It produces a relatively weak commitment to 
 47.  See HOBBES, supra note 21, at 123 (declaring that the sovereign has the right to determine 
and judge what opinions and doctrines are conducive to peace, and thus should be permitted). 
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religious liberty in practice and rapidly collapses into the fourth stance: 
religious intolerance in a culture of disbelief.48  The mild justifications for 
religious liberty, under the third view, collapse when one leans on them with 
the least bit of weight.  If God does not exist, or if we no longer are willing 
to grant as our background premise for interpreting and applying the 
Religion Clauses the assumption that God exists, religious liberty as a rule 
makes less and less and less sense.49 
If the Religion Clauses are to make sense, they must be understood in 
the sense and in the social context in which they were originally written.  
And so we are left with the original, late-eighteenth century reasons for 
religious freedom.  Religious freedom, in the sense of categorical protection 
of religious conduct from state interference, makes entire sense within an 
eighteenth century conception that thinks religion is categorically a good 
thing; that religion aims at, and left alone may well hit, something true, vital, 
and of the highest importance; and that, because true religion is intrinsically 
worth protecting for its own sake, it merits being placed beyond the reach of 
society’s usual rules.  In short, we protect the core freedom because we 
believe it consists of something objectively important and true, and we adopt 
an overbroad prophylactic rule for the sake of protecting the core freedom, 
even if that means putting up with a lot of pernicious “religious” weeds in 
order not to uproot what may end up being the good crop.50 
 48.  The phrase “culture of disbelief” was popularized by Stephen Carter’s excellent book 
several years ago.  See CARTER, supra note 25, at 23. 
 49.  Commenting on the draft version of this paper at the Pepperdine conference where it was 
presented, Professor Volokh noted that the logic of my argument implies that in a “majority 
irreligious” nation, where a country does not believe in the notion of true religious propositions, it 
should not protect religious freedom.  This is almost right: as a descriptive matter, surely, one would 
not expect such a society to adopt a constitutional provision generously and genuinely protecting 
religious freedom and, if it had earlier adopted one, one would not expect such a society to interpret 
and apply even a generously worded provision in a generous, genuinely religion-protective fashion.  
(Indeed, this describes many societies’ religious sociology and attendant treatment of religious 
liberty, even where written constitutional language is quite religion-protective.)  As a normative 
matter, however, I would not go so far as to say that such a society should not adopt a protection of 
religious liberty.  I simply would not expect them to do so. 
  But all of that is, or should be, beside the point as concerns the original meaning of the 
Constitution’s Religion Clauses.  Even if one might not expect society today to be as favorably 
disposed toward religion and its exercise as it was more than two hundred years ago, that does not 
alter the meaning of the constitutional provision that was written and adopted more than two 
hundred years ago.  See generally Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own 
Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 875–77, 910–14, 916–19. 
 50.  See supra pp. 1176 (noting that the religious freedom rule aims to protect religious truth 
without sweeping in too many of the untrue claims made in the name of religion).  For a religious 
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That this was essentially the view of religious freedom that animated the 
First Amendment Religion Clauses is fairly clear.  The difficulty with such a 
proposition is not that it is contrary to historical evidence of the original 
meaning of the First Amendment; on the contrary, as a matter of history it is 
reasonably definite that the Religion Clauses reflect precisely such 
premises.51  The difficulty rather is that such a position feels uncomfortable 
today.  It does not comport with modern sense and modern sensibilities.  It 
feels anachronistic, jarring, a relic of a bygone era.  And in a sense it is: the 
original meaning of the Religion Clauses, as a protection of freedom 
specifically for religion—for the benefit of religion, for religious exercise, 
and for religious persons and groups—does not comport with modern 
perceptions of what makes good constitutional policy sense. 
What of it?  If the task of constitutional interpretation is to recover the 
original linguistic sense and meaning of a provision of the Constitution—a 
disputed proposition to be sure, but one I take as my starting point here52— 
then the fact that what is recovered offends modern sensibilities is really 
beside the point.  It might mean that we as a society would not today adopt 
analogy, consider Jesus’s “Parable of the Weeds,” recorded in Matthew 13:24–30 (Today’s English 
Version):  
Jesus told them another parable:  
  The Kingdom of heaven is like this. A man sowed good seed in his field.  One night, 
when everyone was asleep, an enemy came and sowed weeds among the wheat and went 
away.  When the plants grew and the heads of grain began to form, then the weeds 
showed up.  The man's servants came to him and said, Sir, it was good seed you sowed in 
your field; where did the weeds come from?  It was some enemy who did this, he 
answered.  Do you want us to go and pull up the weeds? they asked him.  No, he 
answered, because as you gather the weeds you might pull up some of the wheat along 
with them.  Let the wheat and the weeds both grow together until harvest. Then I will tell 
the harvest workers to pull up the weeds first, tie them in bundles and burn them, and 
then to gather in the wheat and put it in my barn. 
 51.  The historical case for religious premises animating the Religion Clauses has been well 
made by numerous scholars.  One of the leading modern legal scholars of the Religion Clauses, 
Professor (and former Judge) Michael McConnell, has set forth at length the religious-premises 
historical origins of the Religion Clauses, noting in particular the relevance of the Great Awakening 
and of resulting religious arguments for religious liberty to understanding the movement for explicit 
constitutional protection of religious liberty.  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1410  (1990).  Additional and 
similar such evidence has been marshaled by numerous other scholars, regularly producing the same 
conclusion over the course of many years.  For a sampling of some of the best treatments, see, e.g., 
DONALD DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT (2010); CURRY, supra note 10; 
HOWE, supra note 10.  In this respect, history confirms intuition.  As historian Mark DeWolfe Howe 
aptly put it: “Though it would be possible . . . that men who were deeply skeptical in religious 
matters should demand a constitutional prohibition against abridgments of religious liberty, surely it 
is more probable that the demand should come from those who themselves were believers.”  HOWE, 
supra note 10, at 15. 
 52.  For a full-throated defense of original-public-meaning-whole-text-in-context-textualism as 
the single, correct approach to interpreting the Constitution, see Paulsen, Does the Constitution 
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 857; see also Kesavan & Paulsen, 
Interpretive Force, supra note 39. 
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the substance of the Religion Clauses as they were written and understood in 
1789.  It might mean that modern society should, through some suitable 
authoritative act (of constitutional amendment or perhaps revolution) reject 
the original meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clauses as binding 
law for us today.53  But it does not alter the meaning of the constitutional 
provisions that were in fact enacted many years ago.54  To whatever extent 
those provisions continue to be considered binding as law today, it is the 
original sense and meaning of those provisions, not modern preferences, that 
controls. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
This view of the reason for religious liberty in the American 
constitutional system has important implications for understanding the 
specific provisions of the Religion Clauses.  It “maps” well onto the 
language of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, helping 
to clarify ambiguities and resolve points of uncertainty or controversy in the 
constitutional language in several distinct ways. 
First, it points decisively in the direction of the “pro-exemptions” view 
of the Free Exercise Clause, by providing a persuasive justification for 
adopting the religious perspective of the religious adherent, rather than the 
perspective of the indifferent government bureaucrat, in understanding what 
constitutes a law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.55 
Second, it points strongly in the direction of deference to the religious 
adherent’s sincere understanding of his religious beliefs and what 
constitutes a burden on his free exercise resulting from a requirement of law 
preventing, punishing, or penalizing religious conduct.56 
Third, it points strongly in the direction of a relatively more narrow, 
specific, traditional, arguably theistic understanding of “religion,” as 
opposed to looser, modern tendencies to treat any and all belief systems 
comparably.57  It does so by providing a coherent basis for understanding the 
 53.  The decision to be bound by (or to continue to be bound by) a written constitution is a 
political decision, entirely separate from the question of what that written constitution means.  
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 910–
12, 918–19. 
 54.  See supra notes 5152. 
 55.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 56.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 57.  See infra Part IV.A.3. 
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original constitutional meaning of “religion” as grounded in a concern for 
certain sorts of belief systems only, and for the specific and unique type of 
conflict posed for the religious adherent between the competing claims of 
God and of secular law. 
Fourth, it favors a narrow view of what might constitute sufficiently 
“compelling” reasons for denying a claim of freedom to engage in religious 
conduct and supplies a different and ultimately more satisfying justification 
for such exceptions as grounded not in the ultimate supremacy of the state 
but in the limits of what claims plausibly may be attributed to the commands 
of God.58 
Fifth and finally, it supports a straightforward reading of the 
Establishment Clause as a cognate provision protecting freedom for religious 
exercise by prohibiting government coercion or compulsion to engage in 
religious exercise, in part flowing from religious premises that true religious 
faith cannot result from coercion but only from free inquiry, free persuasion, 
and freely-formed conviction.59  The Establishment Clause is not sensibly 
read, in context, as an “anti-religion” or “freedom from religion” provision 
designed to extirpate religious exercise, observance, or advocacy from the 
public civil life of the community.  Rather, it is an affirmative protection of 
religious liberty that complements the Free Exercise Clause by categorically 
ousting the coercive power of the state in matters of religious exercise. 
In what follows, I develop each of these points in the context of 
considering the specific language of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.  
The first four points fall under the heading of the Free Exercise Clause, the 
fifth point under the Establishment Clause. 
A.  The Free Exercise Clause as a Substantive Freedom—For Religion 
1.  “. . . no law prohibiting . . .” 
The Free Exercise Clause bans federal laws (and, by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, state and local laws) “prohibiting” the free exercise 
of religion.60  Perhaps the central question of Free Exercise Clause 
interpretation is the meaning of “law prohibiting.”  Does it refer only to laws 
that, by their terms, regulate religious practice specifically?  That is, is the 
clause one that forbids only those requirements of law that specifically target 
or discriminate against religious practice because it is religious practice?  
 58.  See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 59.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 60.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that 
the Free Exercise Clause is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation on the powers 
of state governments). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:44 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1159, 2013] The Priority of God 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1191 
The position that answers this question “yes” may be called the “non-
discrimination rule” reading. 
Or, does it, in addition, forbid the imposition of legal requirements that 
have the effect of punishing, penalizing, or preventing free religious 
exercise, whether government is intentionally targeting religious practice or 
not?  That is, does the clause create (or recognize) an affirmative, 
substantive right to engage in religious exercise, free from government’s 
usual powers to legislate through otherwise neutral laws?  This may be 
called the “substantive right” or “exemptions” reading.  In short, is the Free 
Exercise Clause about what government is aiming at with its laws (the non-
discrimination rule reading) or about what it hits (the effects, or substantive 
right reading)? 
The language of the Free Exercise Clause, standing alone, arguably 
could be read either way.  How does one resolve the ambiguity?  One 
answer is to move next to other, second-best evidence of constitutional 
meaning, such as historical evidence concerning probable original intention 
or understanding.61  Another answer, typically employed only if neither text 
nor history resolves the issue, is to default to the principle that if the text 
does not forbid government action, there is no sufficient basis for concluding 
that any definite constitutional rule invalidates the action.62  These are both 
legitimate next-step moves, and in the case of the Free Exercise Clause they 
tend to point in opposing directions.  History strongly supports the pro-
exemptions reading;63 a default rule of government power of course supports 
the narrower, anti-discrimination-rule-only reading (the approach and 
conclusion of Employment Division v. Smith).64 
 61.  Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note 39, at 1148–83 (historical evidence 
provides worthy second-best evidence of original public meaning); see also Kesavan & Paulsen, Is 
West Virginia Unconstitutional?, supra note 39, at 363–95 (similar). 
 62.  Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30, 
at 878–82. 
 63.  See McConnell, supra note 51.  Though McConnell’s evidence represents, in my estimation, 
the best treatment of the historical evidence on this issue, it should be noted that there are important 
competing accounts.  See Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An 
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992). 
 64.  494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (“As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given 
that [exemptions] meaning.”).  Smith proceeded from this observation of textual ambiguity not to 
history, nor straight to a default rule of government power, but to a consideration of precedent: “Our 
decisions reveal that the latter [non-discrimination] reading is the correct one.  We have never held 
that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”  Id. at 878–79.  The Smith Court’s treatment of 
precedent as uniformly supporting its interpretation is extraordinarily tendentious, bordering on 
dishonest, as nearly all commentators agree.  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free 
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Might an understanding of the broader logic and structure of the Free 
Exercise Clause—the sense of the reasons for its inclusion in the First 
Amendment, the sense of the correct paradigm of religious liberty of the four 
discussed, the sense of religious liberty as a pre-constitutional natural and 
inalienable right—help resolve the ambiguity, tilting the conclusion 
decisively in one direction rather than another? 
I believe so.  If the Free Exercise Clause is read from a non-religious 
perspective, one of utter indifference to (or mild hostility toward) religious 
exercise and skepticism about the value of religious devotion as anything 
other than personal preference, then the more “natural” sense of the 
language might seem to be that it is a nondiscrimination rule, not a 
substantive immunity.  If religious freedom is understood not as a natural 
right preceding the social compact of government but as a liberty conferred 
by human governmental authority under a written constitution, it is natural 
to read the right through the lens of governmental authority. 
If, however, the Free Exercise Clause is read from a perspective that 
assumes that religious exercise is a natural, literally God-given, inalienable 
right, accorded constitutional protection because of its presumed intrinsic 
worth and priority over the commands of secular government, it is more 
natural to read “prohibiting” as referring to a law’s consequences for a 
sincere religious believer.  From the perspective that credits the possibility 
that there is such a thing as a God whose commands have priority, and that 
takes as its starting point the proposition that religious freedom is the state’s 
recognition of the strong presumptive validity of that ordering of priorities, it 
makes little sense to read the Free Exercise Clause as anything other than 
ousting state authority over the believer’s conduct, wherever and whenever 
such state authority is in genuine conflict with genuine religious obligation.  
To read the Free Exercise Clause not as recognizing a substantive right but 
as merely stating a non-discrimination rule would largely fail to serve the 
purposes for which the right presumably exists.  Moreover, it would permit 
government to circumvent religious freedom seemingly at will, by the 
artifice of crafting its legal rules in ostensibly general, religion-neutral 
language.  For example: “all citizens must eat pork.”65  “Everyone must be 
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise 
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 n.3 (1991) (remarking that Smith’s “use of precedent 
borders on fiction” even while defending its revisionist reading of the Free Exercise Clause); 
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1109 (1990); Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5, at 251 n.8. 
 65.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Obama’s Contraception Cram-Down: The Pork Precedent, 
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.thepublicdisclosure.com/2012/02/4777 (citing 
ancient religious texts recounting emperor Antioches Epiphanes IV “neutral” command that all 
persons, including Jews, publicly eat pork). 
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available to work on all days of the week to qualify.”66  “Every employer 
must provide health insurance coverage for employees that includes 
contraception and abortion.”67 
The religious perspective of the Religion Clauses strongly suggests that 
the “substantive right” or “exemptions” reading is the correct one.  It goes a 
long way in the direction of clarifying the linguistic ambiguity of the Free 
Exercise Clause, by indicating which general stance with respect to religious 
liberty is the preferred one from which to view the clause.  Taken together 
with other evidence of original meaning, including historical evidence 
supporting the understanding that freedom of religious exercise was 
understood at the time of the framing as contemplating religion-specific 
exemptions from general laws,68 it indicates that the general rule of 
Employment Division v. Smith, that neutral laws of general applicability 
ordinarily cannot be taken to violate the Free Exercise Clause rights of 
individuals and groups, is simply wrong.  Smith makes a certain amount of 
sense if the “modern” stance toward religious liberty is right.69  It makes 
little or no sense if the “liberal” stance is correct.70 
2.  “. . . the free exercise . . .” 
It is often said, almost as a throwaway line, that, under the First 
Amendment Free Exercise Clause, freedom of religious belief is “absolute,” 
but in the nature of things, freedom of religious conduct cannot be.71  What 
is interesting, however, is that the Free Exercise Clause says nothing about 
belief in and of itself.  It speaks solely in terms of the exercise of religion.  
Freedom of belief seems to have been assumed—so much taken for granted, 
perhaps, that the First Amendment does not even need to speak of it.  
 66.  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (“The ruling forces her to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one 
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.  Governmental imposition 
of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine 
imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”). 
 67.  The issue of compelled inclusion of contraception, sterilization, and abortion drugs as 
“preventive health care” where employers offer health insurance coverage to employees is, as of the 
time of this writing, very much a live controversy.  See Paulsen, Obama’s Contraception Cram-
Down, supra note 65. 
 68.  See McConnell, supra note 51. 
 69.  See supra Part II.C. 
 70.  See supra Part II.B. 
 71.  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“The [First] Amendment 
embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first is absolute but, in the 
nature of things, the second cannot be.”); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990). 
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Religious belief is either not protected (which would be a rather surprising 
conclusion) or, more likely, subsumed within the broader category of free 
exercise, as an a fortiori case: believing is itself a religious activity, an 
exercise of religion.  If government may not prohibit religious exercise, it 
surely cannot prohibit religious belief, the “lesser-included” predicate 
conduct, as it were.   
The larger point is that the text of the First Amendment does not treat 
religious belief and conduct differently, the former absolutely protected and 
the other qualified or limited.  It treats them alike and provides, simply, a 
right to their “free exercise.”  Whatever the scope of the Free Exercise 
Clause’s right, whether a non-discrimination proviso or a substantive right or 
immunity, the thing it protects is religious action—activity, exercise.  The 
Free Exercise right is a right to engage in conduct—conduct attributable to 
religious motivations or beliefs.  This plain-language reading should not be 
at all troubling from a linguistic perspective.  Moreover, it coheres 
particularly well with the conception of religious freedom as being 
specifically about protecting religion because the true commands of God are 
of superior obligation to the commands of human society.  If one held such a 
conception, one would want a religious freedom provision that protected 
religious exercise, not just belief.  Freedom to believe is not enough.  For the 
believer, there must be freedom to act in accordance with belief. 
By the same token, if one held the more religion-skeptical, “modern” 
view of the justification for religious liberty—that religion should be 
tolerated, along with and on the same terms as other belief systems, for 
general reasons of tolerating individual beliefs wherever possible, 
notwithstanding general disbelief in God—then one probably would want a 
constitutional religious freedom provision that emphasized freedom of 
belief, broadly conceived, but that de-emphasized freedom of action 
(exercise).  In short, one would want a constitutional provision that really 
does say what more modern judicial decisions have sloppily interpreted the 
Free Exercise Clause to say: that freedom of belief is absolute and freedom 
of action in its nature is not.72  One would also want a religious freedom 
provision that de-emphasized the “religious” nature of the freedom.  The fact 
that the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of religious exercise 
specifically, rather than belief, thus subtly tends to buttress the religious-
liberty-for-the-sake-of-religion paradigm and the interpretive conclusions 
that follow from it. 
The Free Exercise Clause says, further, that the right to religious 
exercise is the right to its “free” exercise, a word choice suggesting that legal 
restrictions or burdens of any kind on the exercise of religion are forbidden.  
 72.  See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303–04; Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990). 
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For a time in the 1980s, before the decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith, the U.S. Department of Justice took the position that the word 
“prohibiting” in the Free Exercise Clause meant that small-ish burdens on 
religious exercise, not wholly preventing its exercise, were allowed.73  Such a 
position of course gives little or no weight to the word “free” in the Free 
Exercise Clause.  Viewed from the perspective that religious liberty exists 
precisely to protect the priority of religious obligation over secular authority, 
however, so narrow a reading of what counts as “prohibiting” the “free 
exercise” of religion becomes hard to sustain.  The more natural reading of 
the whole text, in linguistic and historical context, is that it forbids 
government from imposing any punishment, penalty, or privation that 
operates meaningfully to impair the religious adherent’s ability to comply 
with the dictates of faith, as the religious adherent understands those 
dictates.  Moreover, whether and to what degree the ability to act 
consistently with one’s faith is meaningfully impaired by the state’s action 
is, similarly, a question of the religious adherent’s understanding of the 
impact such a legal requirement has on his or her ability to act faithfully.74 
 73.  OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ NO. 115053, REPORT TO THE ATT’Y 
GEN.: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 7 (1986); see, e.g., Brief for United 
States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of 
Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (No. 85-993). 
 74.  This is generally in accord with pre-Smith doctrinal treatments.  The classic case for the 
proposition that it is the religious adherent’s understanding of the requirements of his faith that 
counts, not the state’s view of what the adherent’s faith requires and whether or not it is burdened by 
the state’s action, is Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 
707 (1981).  In Thomas, the government had urged that the religious claimant’s beliefs were not 
principled or consistent and, further, that they did not conform to any specific command of a given 
church, denomination, or sect.  Id. at 714–15.  The Court held, rightly, that this did not matter.  Id. at 
716.  While the Free Exercise Clause only protects beliefs “rooted in religion” and not in purely 
secular or personal philosophical beliefs, the protection of religious beliefs does not “turn upon a 
judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be 
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment 
protection.”  Id. at 713–14.  Nor did it matter that other members of Thomas’s faith (Jehovah’s 
Witnesses) might not share his specific religious objection.  Id. at 715.  “Intrafaith differences of that 
kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed,” the Court said, and it is not for 
government officials (including courts) to judge such matters of scriptural or doctrinal interpretation.  
Id. at 715–16.  On the contrary, “the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are 
shared by all of the members of a religious sect.”  Id.  “We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a line, 
and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.  Courts should not 
undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with his 
position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more 
sophisticated person might employ.”  Id. at 715. 
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3.  “. . . religion . . .” 
But what counts as “religion?”  If the premises justifying constitutional 
religious liberty imply that the state generally must defer to an individual’s 
understanding of what his faith requires of him, does that mean, further, that 
the Free Exercise Clause immunity extends to anything and everything an 
individual sincerely calls or considers his “religion?”  Does it mean, further 
yet, that any and all strongly held personal beliefs—those that might 
resemble (in certain ways) traditional religious beliefs and that might be held 
with similar intensity and tenacity—must be treated as falling within the 
Constitution’s protection for the free exercise of “religion,” whether the 
individual considers such beliefs religious or not and irrespective of whether 
they fit the paradigm of the state recognizing and yielding to the presumed a 
priori priority of God? 
This is the slippery slope down which the modern Supreme Court slid, a 
long way, in a series of cases in the 1960s and 1970s involving claims of 
conscientious exemption to the military draft.75  The slide in many ways 
perfectly characterizes the “modern” stance toward religious freedom: there 
is nothing particularly distinctive about religious ethical claims.  Thus, not 
only must “religion” therefore be construed broadly, but also analogous non-
religious ethical claims need to be treated comparably, lest religion be 
preferred to non-religion.  The slide also accounts, to a fair degree, for the 
decline of aggressive protection of the free exercise of religion in the 
modern era.76 
The first case in this line was United States v. Seeger, decided in 1965.77  
At issue was whether Mr. Seeger satisfied the federal statutory standard for 
conscientious exemption from compulsory service for persons categorically 
opposed to war in any form, by virtue of “religious training and belief.”78  
The Court counted Mr. Seeger’s self-styled “religious” belief in “goodness 
and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical 
creed,” as close enough (for government purposes) to satisfy the statutory 
standard.79  Seeger considered his ethical beliefs “religious”—he put 
quotation marks around the term in the military’s registration form—and 
that satisfied the Court,80 notwithstanding the statute’s specific definition of 
religious belief as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being 
 75.  See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 76.  I have used the draft exemption cases to illustrate a similar point in prior writing.  Paulsen, 
Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1617–20. 
 77.  380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 78.  Id. at 165. 
 79.  Id. at 166. 
 80.  Id. at 187. 
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involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation” and not 
including “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a 
merely personal moral code.”81 
The Court in Seeger adopted the following spin on the statutory 
language: “[t]he test might be stated in these words: [a] sincere and 
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel 
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption 
comes within the statutory definition.”82  Thus, for statutory purposes 
(though the decision obviously had constitutional overtones as well), the 
Court deemed “religion” to include “sincere and meaningful” beliefs 
“parallel” to traditional religious theistic belief systems, as long as the 
believer considered such beliefs religious.83 
Then came Welsh v. United States, in 1970, the next case in a law 
professor’s perfect series of hypotheticals.84  Mr. Welsh considered his 
beliefs not to be religious and struck out the word “religious” on the form.85  
But he still objected to participating in war in any form.86  What result now?
(As an aside, it is worth noting that an awful lot had happened between 1965 
and 1970 in American public life and law.  The Vietnam War had become 
substantially more unpopular; draft evasion, in various legal and illegal 
forms, had become common.  Public draft card burning had become a 
notorious form of protest, addressed in a major Supreme Court decision 
interpreting the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.87  Robert 
Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been assassinated in 1968.  The 
nation had experienced severe and violent riots, including many over the 
Vietnam War.  And a general cultural revolution against traditional values 
and authority was well underway.88)     
The Court in Welsh expanded the definition of religion to embrace non-
religious beliefs.89  A four-Justice plurality voted to repaint the statute so that 
 81.  Id. at 165 (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)). 
 82.  Id. at 176. 
 83.  Id. at 166, 176. 
 84.  398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 85.  Id. at 337. 
 86.  Id. at 343. 
 87.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (upholding constitutionality of 
statute forbidding destruction, including burning, of draft cards, against challenge that it violated the 
Free Speech Clause).   
 88.  For an early, but still classic, social history of the period, see WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, COMING 
APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 1960’S (1969).  For a classic treatment in song, see DON 
MCLEAN, AMERICAN PIE (United Artists 1971). 
 89.  Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343–44. 
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“religious” meant, in effect, “either religious or non-religious,” on the theory 
that Welsh’s case was essentially indistinguishable from Seeger on its facts 
and that Seeger had already pretty much adopted such a position.90  “What is 
necessary under Seeger,” the plurality said, is that the registrant’s opposition 
to war “stem from” “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right 
and wrong and that those beliefs be held with the strength of traditional 
religious convictions.”91  Thus, “[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds 
beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that 
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from . . . war,” 
those beliefs “function as a religion in his life” and entitle him to 
conscientious objector status as much as someone whose views flow from 
religious convictions.92  As for Welsh’s explicit disclaimer that his views did 
not stem from religious belief, the Court held that this did not matter so 
much after all.93  Mr. Welsh had simply erred in thinking that his ethical 
views did not count as “religious” within the meaning of the statute, at least 
as construed by the Court.  (He apparently had not read Seeger carefully.94) 
Justice Harlan could not stomach such a pretense and declined to join 
the plurality’s statutory interpretation holding.95  Nonetheless, he provided 
the fifth vote in Welsh’s favor, arguing that extension of draft exemption to 
nonreligious claimants was necessary to avoid what he thought otherwise 
would be a violation of the Establishment Clause.96  Limiting the exemption 
“to those opposed to war in general because of theistic beliefs runs afoul” of 
the First Amendment, Harlan wrote.97  Taking as his starting point the 
proposition that the Free Exercise Clause did not require exemptions for 
religious conduct—Harlan acknowledged that he had been a dissenter in 
Sherbert v. Verner and that he adhered to that dissenting view with respect 
to the Court’s Free Exercise Clause doctrine at the time98—he concluded that 
government, “having chosen to exempt, . . . cannot draw the line between 
 90.  See id. 
 91.  Id. at 339–40 (emphasis added). 
 92.  Id. at 340. 
 93.  Id. at 341. 
 94.  The attempt to distinguish Seeger, the plurality wrote, “fails for the reason that it places 
undue emphasis on the registrant’s interpretation of his own beliefs.”  Id.  Because “very few 
registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word ‘religious’ as used in [the statute],” it 
followed that “a registrant’s statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide” 
to whether they are religious or not.  Id. 
 95.  See id. at 344 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 96.  Id. at 357–58. 
 97.  Id. at 345. 
 98.  Id. at 356 (citing his dissent in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)).  Sherbert held that the Free Exercise Clause forbids government from conditioning a 
benefit (in that case, unemployment compensation benefits) on conduct inconsistent with an 
individual’s exercise of her sincerely-held religious beliefs, absent demonstrated threat to interests of 
the highest order.  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409–10. 
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theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on 
the other.”99  Even if the statute could be construed to embrace “non-theistic 
religions,” it still “draws the line between religious and nonreligious” and, 
that “in my view offends the Establishment Clause.”100 
This had been the thrust of the arguments in the lower courts, in both 
Seeger’s and Welsh’s cases—that protecting religious conscientious 
objections (and specifically theistic beliefs) but not protecting non-religious 
conscientious objections was illegitimate and unconstitutional.  Behind this, 
of course, was the modern, skeptical view of the nature of religious belief 
and the resulting modern stance toward religious freedom: toleration, in so 
far as practical, of beliefs of all kinds, irrespective of their provenance.  
Non-religious belief systems needed to be treated the same as religious 
belief systems, as a basic principle of religious freedom, because, as the 
Second Circuit put it in Seeger, “today, a pervading commitment to a moral 
ideal is for many the equivalent of what was historically considered the 
response to divine commands.”101 
Harlan could not swallow the plurality’s cramming of the modern stance 
on “religion” into the statutory language.102  But he swallowed it whole as 
constitutional reasoning.103  On that ground, he joined in engrafting onto the 
statute a provision for conscientious exemption of non-religious 
individuals.104  For Harlan, constitutional religious liberty not only did not 
require exemption of individuals from laws that conflicted with their good-
faith understanding of God’s prior and superior commands, it forbade 
exemption of religion specifically in preference to non-religious beliefs.105  
Religious freedom, in short, meant that religion and non-religion had to be 
treated the same way.106  The plurality had come to this conclusion in the 
guise of statutory construction; Harlan’s opinion embraced the same result 
explicitly as constitutional law. 
Seeger and Welsh, though in form statutory decisions, amounted to a 
minor revolution in the constitutional treatment of religion.  As I have put it 
 99.  Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 100.  Id. at 357. 
 101.  United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 853 (2d Cir. 1964), aff’d, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 102.  Welsh, 398 U.S. at 354 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 103.  Id. at 357–58. 
 104.  Id. at 358. 
 105.  See id. 
 106.  See id. at 361 (“To conform with the requirements of the First Amendment’s religious 
clauses as reflected in the mainstream of American history, legislation must, at the very least, be 
neutral.”). 
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elsewhere, “their one-two punch has cast a long shadow over the Court’s 
religion clause jurisprudence.”107  The logic of their holdings is that any 
serious accommodation of religious conscience constitutionally must 
embrace analogous claims of non-religious conscience.108 
The third case in the draft exemption trilogy, Gillette v. United States, 
was decided in 1971, the year after Welsh.109  Two rather different claimants 
argued for a right to selective conscientious objection—a moral objection 
not to all wars but only to certain “unjust” ones.110  The statute did not 
extend so far, but only protected those who opposed participation in war in 
any form.111  One of the two claimants was a clearly religious Roman 
Catholic who adhered to Catholic “just war” doctrine, which explicitly 
differentiates a Christian’s conscientious moral duty in different types of war 
situations.112  The other was a Seeger-Welsh-style non-religious ethical 
objector to the Vietnam War in particular as an unjust war.113  To the modern 
perspective, of course, the situations appeared identical.  And the one thing 
that seemed clear from the outset in Gillette, given Seeger and Welsh, was 
that the two claims would be resolved the same way. 
The Court rejected both claims.114  This was not very surprising: given 
increased opposition to the Vietnam War, and to the draft, accommodation 
of essentially all claims to conscientious objection to the draft came to be 
seen by the Court as intolerable.115  In the political and social context, and 
given the premises of Seeger and Welsh, it would in effect mean the 
evisceration of the draft.  The power to conscript for military service in an 
increasingly unpopular war would be subject to the individual veto of the 
putative draftee, a result desired by none of the justices (save Justice 
Douglas, in lone and perpetual dissent over anything involving the 
 107.  Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1618. 
 108.  The Court has not been perfectly consistent on this point.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of 
Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (“Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, 
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely 
secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in 
religious belief.”); cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 710 (2005) (“[R]eligious accommodations 
need not ‘come packaged with benefits to secular entities.’” (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987))). 
 109.  401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
 110.  Id. at 439, 441. 
 111.  Id. at 443. 
 112.  Id. at 441. 
 113.  Id. at 439. 
 114.  Id. at 463. 
 115.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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government’s power with respect to the Vietnam War).116  Under such 
circumstances, protection of all individual claims of conscience became too 
much weight for the Free Exercise Clause to bear.  And so the Court beat a 
hasty retreat from the aggressive protection of religious (and non-religious) 
conscience. 
The Court’s discussion is revealing.  To protect just-war conscientious 
objection, for religious and non-religious persons alike, would embrace “[a] 
virtually limitless variety of beliefs.”117  Ordinary “dissent from policy” 
might “appear as the concrete basis of an objection that has roots as well in 
conscience and religion.”118  Sorting the two would be nearly impossible.  
“Moreover, the belief that a particular war at a particular time is unjust is by 
its nature changeable and subject to nullification by changing events.”119  
The claim is “ultimately subjective, depending on the claimant’s view of the 
facts in relation to his judgment that a given factor or congeries of factors 
colors the character of the war as a whole.”120 
Accommodating such “ultimately subjective” claims of conscience was 
especially unconscionable given the diversity of religious and secular claims 
of morality: “[o]urs is a Nation of enormous heterogeneity in respect of 
political views, moral codes, and religious persuasions.”121  To grant all such 
claims was to the Court unthinkable—impractical and extreme—but to grant 
some but not others was just as unthinkable, for different reasons: it could 
produce “religious discrimination.”122  “[A] claim’s chances of success 
would be greater the more familiar or salient the claim’s connection with 
conventional religiosity could be made to appear,” the Court added, citing 
 116.  Gillette, 401 U.S. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas, of course, had dissented 
vehemently and regularly from the claimed authority of the Executive Branch to wage the Vietnam 
War at all, in cases presenting the issue—and in cases not presenting the issue, but involving 
individual acts of protest and resistance.  See Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (majority denying certiorari for a draft challenge); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 
414 U.S. 1316 (1973) (Douglas, J.) (lifting stay of injunction against use of armed force in 
Cambodia); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of 
leave to file complaint) (collecting Douglas’s other opinions asserting the unconstitutionality of the 
Vietnam War); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting from decision upholding conviction for draft card burning against First Amendment free 
speech challenge, asserting that question of Vietnam War’s constitutionality was a question that 
needed to be resolved). 
 117.  Gillette, 401 U.S. at 455. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 456. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 457. 
 122.  Id. (noting the danger of “unintended religious discrimination”). 
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the Establishment Clause and recent decisions made under it.123  “While the 
danger of erratic decisionmaking unfortunately exists in any system of 
conscription that takes individual differences into account, no doubt the 
dangers would be enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate 
scope were honored in theory.”124 
The Free Exercise Clause never fully recovered from the cumulative 
effect of the draft exemption cases.  The pro-exemptions view made a brief 
comeback the next year, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, upholding the right of Amish 
communities to discontinue formal schooling past the eighth grade.125  But 
Yoder soon came to be regarded as the exceptional case, with further 
exemptions on Free Exercise Clause grounds largely limited in Supreme 
Court cases, to claims involving unemployment compensation, until even 
that string was broken in Employment Division v. Smith.126 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 458.  One can hear distinct echoes of Gillette in the Court’s decision and opinion in 
Employment Division v. Smith, two decades later:  
Any society adopting such a system [of requiring individual religious exemptions from 
laws of general applicability] would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in 
direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to 
coerce or suppress none of them.  Precisely because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made 
up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference,” . . . and precisely because 
we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming 
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct 
that does not protect an interest of the highest order. 
494 U.S. 872, 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)). 
  Justice Douglas’s dissent in Gillette shared the premises of the majority that accommodating 
religion necessarily meant accommodating a virtually limitless number and diversity of secular 
claims for religious conscientious exemption.  See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
He simply would have granted exemption to all, rather than withholding it from all: “Conscience is 
often the echo of religious faith.  But, as this case illustrates, it may also be the product of travail, 
meditation, or sudden revelation related to a moral comprehension of the dimensions of a problem, 
not to a religion in the ordinary sense.”  Id. at 466.  The two situations, for Douglas, had to be treated 
the same way.  The exemption statute, as written, “is a species of those which show an invidious 
discrimination in favor of religious persons and against others with like scruples.”  Id. at 468.  
Government, he argued, had to be neutral between religious belief and other belief.  Id. at 468–69. 
 125.  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 126.  Sherbert v. Verner is the leading modern case for the broad view of the Free Exercise Clause 
as requiring exemptions for religion from laws of general applicability.  374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
Sherbert held that a state could not condition eligibility for unemployment compensation, as applied 
to a Saturday Sabbath observer, on being available for work six days a week (including Saturday).  
Id. at 410.  Free Exercise Clause claims for religious-specific exemption from nominally neutral 
unemployment compensation rules were similarly upheld in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana 
Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission 
of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 489 U.S. 829 (1989).  
Even that string ended with Employment Division v. Smith, which rejected a claim for 
unemployment compensation for a person who was unemployed by virtue of religious conduct in 
conflict with state criminal drug-use rule.  494 U.S. 490 (1990). 
  In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), 
the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Free Exercise Clause requires that churches’ decisions 
with respect to the hiring and firing of ministers be exempt from facially neutral employment 
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The essential problem—a problem that continues to bedevil religious 
freedom today—is that to define “religion” within the meaning of the 
Constitution (or federal statutes) as embracing essentially any strongly-held 
comprehensive personal or community belief system is to drain the term of 
meaning.  Doing so wrenches the word “religion” from its original 
constitutional and social context and gives it a new, ahistorical modern 
meaning more in harmony with the modern stance toward religious freedom 
as protecting freedom and personal beliefs, generally.  The result, ultimately, 
is not to bring all personal beliefs up to the level of protection accorded 
genuine exercise of religious faith, but to bring truly religious beliefs down 
to the level of protection accorded all personal beliefs—which is, to put 
them at the mercy of popular will.  Ironically, “defining” (if that is the right 
word) “religion” so broadly as to include most everything under the sun ends 
up reading the Free Exercise Clause out of the Constitution, at least insofar 
as it is thought an affirmative, substantive individual liberty. 
The correct answer depends, I submit, on the correct paradigm.  We 
protect religious liberty on the premise that God is real and that the true 
priorities of God trump the ordinary commands of man.  We do not protect 
secular conscience, generally, in the same way, because the nature of the 
conflict between an individual’s own personal ethical views and the 
requirements of the state is not the same thing.  The nature of religious 
obligation is intrinsically different from philosophical or moral belief 
systems that involve no conception of a transcendent Creator, God.  The 
believer understands himself to be under the superior authority of God.  The 
ethical humanist, secularist, or atheist does not; he does not believe in God.  
Rather, he is subject to the moral commands he discerns for himself.  (In a 
very real sense, the atheist is “God” for himself, the only ultimate authority 
over his own conscience.  He really is, in Smith’s words, “a law unto 
himself.”127)  To assume that these situations are the same, to treat them as 
rough equivalents, is to deny the most basic premise on which American 
discrimination laws: “[T]he Free Exercise Clause . . . protects a religious group’s right to shape its 
own faith and mission through its appointments.”  Id. at 697.  The Court noted that, as in Smith, the 
statute at issue was neutral and generally applicable, but distinguished Smith on its facts: “It is true 
that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use, is a valid and 
neutral law of general applicability.  But a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s 
ingestion of peyote.  Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts.  The 
present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision that 
affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”  Id. at 707. 
 127.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 167 (1879)). 
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religious freedom rests and to render the protection specifically of the free 
exercise of religion linguistically (as well as theologically) unintelligible. 
The word “religion,” in the original sense of the term employed by the 
Constitution (and still in common usage today), necessarily involves some 
sort of conception of God (or gods) and the obligations of man and 
restrictions on conduct thought to flow from rightful devotion to the prior 
and superior claims of God.  It is, necessarily, “something more than just the 
projection of an individual’s inner sense of self, value, ethics, or morals, or 
of a social, political, or moral philosophy that involves no such transcendent 
reality or creative force.”128 
As I have written elsewhere, there is probably no better operational 
definition of “religion” in this constitutional sense than the one supplied by 
the original Virginia Declaration of Rights and employed by James Madison 
in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments: religion 
is “the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging 
it.”129  (This is not direct “legislative history” of the meaning of the First 
Amendment.  But it is good contemporaneous evidence of common public 
usage of the term “religion” at or about the time the Constitution was 
adopted.130)  The statutory military draft-exemption definition, before the 
Supreme Court got hold of it, was remarkably similar to that early definition: 
“an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties 
superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] 
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely 
personal moral code.”131 
That statutory definition, in turn, can trace its origins to the outstanding 
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh, 
which the statute fairly copies.132  Indeed, Hughes’s opinion in Macintosh is 
an eloquent defense of American religious freedom as fundamentally rooted 
in the priority of an individual’s duties to God.  Hughes was dissenting from 
the majority’s holding that an applicant for naturalized citizenship could be 
rejected for refusal on religious grounds to promise in advance to bear arms 
in defense of the United States: 
Much has been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty to be 
recognized, it is urged, even though it conflicts with convictions of 
 128.  Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1621–22. 
 129.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (quoting in the appendix 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights). 
 130.  See Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note 39, at 1144–48, 1156–59 (noting 
how contemporaneous documentary evidence can provide important evidence of word usage, and 
sometimes even serve as a “concordance” of constitutional meaning). 
 131.  See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)). 
 132.  United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 627–35 (1931) (Hughes, J., dissenting). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:44 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1159, 2013] The Priority of God 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1205 
duty to God.  Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists within the 
domain of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws 
regardless of scruples.  When one’s belief collides with the power 
of the state, the latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or 
punishment follows.  But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a 
moral power higher than the state has always been maintained.  The 
reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, 
would unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and 
law-abiding citizens.  The essence of religion is belief in a relation 
to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human 
relation. . . .  One cannot speak of religious liberty, with proper 
appreciation of its essential and historic significance, without 
assuming the existence of a belief in supreme allegiance to the will 
of God.  Professor Macintosh, when pressed by the inquiries put to 
him, stated what is axiomatic in religious doctrine.  And, putting 
aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom of 
conscience itself implies respect for an innate conviction of 
paramount duty.  The battle for religious liberty has been fought and 
won with respect to religious beliefs and practices, which are not in 
conflict with good order, upon the very ground of the supremacy of 
conscience within its proper field. . . .  There is abundant room for 
enforcing the requisite authority of law as it is enacted and requires 
obedience, and for maintaining the conception of the supremacy of 
law as essential to orderly government, without demanding that 
either citizens or applicants for citizenship shall assume by oath an 
obligation to regard allegiance to God as subordinate to allegiance 
to civil power.133 
The original, religious understanding of the word “religion” as meaning 
what traditionally would have been understood to be embraced by the word 
“religion” in 1789, obviously possesses a strong textual and contextual claim 
to represent the original meaning of the term.  The only problem with such 
an understanding—if it really is a problem—is that it does not fit well with 
modern sensibilities, which are better reflected by the decisions in Seeger 
and Welsh.134  But those decisions make hash of the word “religion” and they 
make hash of the reasons why the Constitution distinctively protects the free 
exercise of religion.  They also, unwittingly, end up narrowing the sphere of 
 133.  Id. at 633–34. 
 134.  See supra pp. 11961200 
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religious liberty, not broadening it (as Gillette and, eventually, Smith 
show).135  As un-modern, archaic, and ungenerous as it may strike modern 
sensibilities, the word “religion” in the Religion Clauses simply does not 
bear the modern interpretations that have been forced upon it.  “Religion” is 
adherence and devotion to the priority of God.  Seeger and Welsh—and one-
half of Gillette—are wrong. 
4.  The Problem of Exceptional Harm: Implied Exceptions and What 
Might Justify Them 
A consequence of all this is that the Free Exercise Clause, within its 
sphere (of actually religious exercise), presumptively confers a substantive 
freedom from government regulation, for religious conduct—an immunity 
from the usual rules of society.  But can the Free Exercise Clause really 
mean so much?136  What of the problem of exceptional harm—the situation 
where religious conduct imposes essentially intolerable harms on others, or 
grave dangers of such harms?  Would we really permit Abraham to commit 
human sacrifice of his son, Isaac, out of perceived obedience to God and 
excuse the murder of a child from criminal liability on the basis of the Free 
Exercise Clause?137 
Judicial doctrine prior to Employment Division v. Smith, and still for 
certain claims even after Smith as well as under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA),138 traditionally has handled this problem with a 
 135.  See supra pp. 12001204. 
 136.  This is the form of the question posed by Stephen Pepper, in his insightful article on the Free 
Exercise Clause several years ago.  Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 
1986 BYU L. REV. 299. 
 137.  See Genesis 22 (Today’s English Version).  Abraham, of course, did not sacrifice Isaac, but 
was apparently prepared to do so in obedience to God’s command.  Genesis 22:1–10 (Today’s 
English Version).  This was good enough for God (or what God wanted in the first place), and Isaac 
was spared.  Genesis 22:11–19 (Today’s English Version). 
 138.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990).  Smith preserved the compelling interest 
standard for free exercise claims involving challenges to denials of exemption claims where the law 
or rule in question provides individualized accommodation or application in other respects.  See id. 
at 884.  Smith also preserved where a free exercise claim is made in combination with some other 
plausible constitutional claims, such as a substantive due process “parental freedom” claim or a free 
speech claims.  See id. at 881–82.  Whether these exceptions to Smith’s rule make any principled 
sense can be (and has been) doubted.  See Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5, at 251 
n.8 (collecting commentary to this effect).  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) adopts 
the compelling interest standard for all applications of federal law.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006); see 
generally Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5.  The RFRA applies that same standard to 
state law, but the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked power to prescribe such a rule, in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  Congress responded with the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, (RLUIPA), which provides for application of the compelling interest 
standard in challenges to state laws in certain prescribed areas falling within Congress’s power to 
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“compelling state interest” escape hatch: a sufficiently compelling, or 
“paramount” state interest “of the highest order and . . . not otherwise 
served” trumps even sincere claims to religious exercise.139  As a matter of 
the constitutional text, the problem remains that there is no compelling-
interest override written into the Free Exercise Clause; it is all judicial 
interpolation.  How can such an exception be justified as proper 
constitutional interpretation?  (And does this not tend to suggest that the 
broad reading of the Free Exercise Clause, which would necessitate such an 
implied exception, is wrong in the first place?)  Further, as a matter of the 
underlying theory explaining the Religion Clauses as rooted in the idea of 
the priority of God’s commands over man’s and the disability of the state to 
judge to the contrary, why should “compelling state interests”—as 
determined by the state, according to some nonreligious moral or political 
metric—suddenly trump religious claims?  If one grants the premise that we 
protect religious liberty because what is at stake are truly God’s commands 
or expectations, and that these really do prevail over man’s moral law at 
variance with God’s commands, why shouldn’t Abraham win, in principle?  
After all, the Biblical account states that God really did command Abraham 
to kill his son, and only repented once it was clear that Abraham had passed 
the test of absolute loyalty to God and indeed was prepared to carry out 
God’s horrific command.140 
In short, does not the concession to compelling, overriding interests 
contradict the initial premise on which, as I have argued, religious freedom 
rests? 
The problem is a serious one, but one capable of being answered both in 
terms of the constitutional text and the underlying priority-of-God religious 
premises of the Religion Clauses.  Consider for a moment the types of things 
that lie at the core of what are generally thought to be “compelling” 
interests.  Set to one side the fact that governments tend to regard everything 
they do—all official policies and rules—as compelling, a view that, if 
credited, would render the Free Exercise Clause essentially meaningless.141 
regulate interstate commerce and to attach conditions to the receipt of federal expenditures.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 139.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“The essence of all that has been said 
and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise 
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“[I]n this highly sensitive area, only the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation [of religious liberty].”). 
 140.  See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 141.  See generally Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5, at 250–51. 
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Paradigmatic compelling interests include: protection of human life 
from such grave harms as murder; rape; robbery; theft; slavery; infanticide; 
abortion; oppression; violent attacks from others of all kinds; falsity, perjury, 
or fraud to the injury of another and, arguably, some other kinds of very 
serious threats or injury to life, liberty, or even property of another.  
(Conduct posing a sufficiently serious threat or likelihood of such injuries is 
also, typically, regarded as presenting compelling justification for overriding 
religious liberty.)  Typically excluded from such lists are purported harms of 
an individual to himself or herself as a consequence of sincere religious 
conviction.  By extension, harms purely internal to a religious community, 
i.e. those harms that do not involve injury to non-consenting third parties 
outside the community; purported harms to third parties that are either 
relatively minor or that involve injuries to new, non-common law, non-
natural “rights” (For example, statutory rights creating affirmative benefits 
or broad freedom from others’ actions extending beyond traditional baseline 
conceptions of private rights.)142; and general, diffuse, non-cataclysmic 
social and political costs of accommodating religious conduct at variance 
from society’s usual rules, including both the costs of accommodation and 
the administrative inconvenience inherent in carrying out a requirement of 
religious accommodation, are not “harms” sufficient to displace genuine free 
exercise claims.  All of these are less than truly compelling interests, though 
the lines concededly are often difficult to draw.143  Purported injuries or 
harm to children, of many (but not all) kinds, tend to be regarded as 
compelling, because of problems of consent.  But parents’ usual right to 
choose how best to care for, educate, and promote the well-being of their 
children—including the right to choose the religious upbringing of their 
children—usually should lead to children being treated as members of the 
religious community of their parents.144 
 142.  This choice of baselines makes sense.  The sphere of constitutional religious liberty should 
not contract just because the asserted powers of the secular state (including the power to create new 
legal rights or interests) expand. 
 143.  For an excellent, classic discussion of the full range of problems and competing interests 
occasioned by claims of religious freedom, see Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious 
Exemptions—A Research Agenda With Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595 (1999). 
 144.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  See generally Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and 
Schools, supra note 23, at 1939–47.  This creates extraordinarily difficult problems with regard to 
issues of medical care of children, where a religious community’s rules differ dramatically from 
society’s, both the religious and human stakes are high, and the life of a child may hang in the 
balance.  Examples include certain Jehovah’s Witness beliefs against blood transfusions and 
Christian Scientist beliefs favoring spiritual to medical treatment of physical illness in many 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), certiorari 
denied 516 U.S. 1092 (1996) (upholding damages award for wrongful death of child, against 
Christian Science parents and practitioners); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988) 
(upholding criminal conviction for manslaughter and felony child neglect of Christian Science 
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These limitations—the lines drawn by perceived compelling interests—
are as much intuitive as anything.  Yet the intuitions are often valid.  In 
modern times, these intuitions appear to reflect, and track reasonably 
closely, the generally libertarian stance of philosopher John Stuart Mill’s On 
Liberty.145  But because people’s intuitions in this regard differ, and are often 
a function of their own personal religious beliefs or empathy for religious 
conviction generally, they can feel highly subjective.  And as a society 
changes from a liberal religious society to a modern (or post-modern) 
irreligious society, intuitions shift too as to what are sufficiently compelling 
interests to trump religious exercise.  Society’s interests are ratcheted up in 
public estimation, and religious free exercise is less readily indulged as a 
prior and superior value.  Assertions of important state interests in new 
policies or programs readily supplant space formerly reserved for free 
religious exercise.  The result is that the scope of free exercise becomes 
unanchored, tied more to current notions of correct social policy than to any 
fixed, determinate original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.  And, there 
is still the problem that the First Amendment text says nothing at all about 
compelling interest exceptions, the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, or 
anything else of this nature.   
I would like to suggest three possible ways to understand “compelling 
interest” exceptions to, or overrides of, free exercise claims, that harmonize 
better with the text of the First Amendment and with the religious premises 
of the Religion Clauses.  Each is consistent with the others; indeed, they tend 
mutually to reinforce one another.  Significantly, each of these arguments 
tends to limit, quite strictly, the types of things that can be claimed as 
compelling interests.  At the same time, these ways of re-formulating 
compelling interest redirect the inquiry away from the state and its claimed 
interests and toward what plausibly can be claimed in the name of free 
exercise of religion. 
parents for failing to seek medical treatment for ten-year-old daughter with acute meningitis).  See 
also Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. 
Cir. 1964), rehearing en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964), certiorari denied 377 U.S. 
978 (1964) (ordering involuntary blood transfusion over religious objection of adult member of 
Jehovah’s Witness faith); Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1986) (rejecting wrongful death action against Christian Science practitioners with respect 
to adult member).  See generally Geraldine Koeneke Russell, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Refusal of 
Blood Transfusions: A Balance of Interests, 33 CATH. LAW. 361 (1990); John Alan Cohan, Judicial 
Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 860–81 
(2006) (reviewing cases where parents and minors have refused life saving treatment based on 
religious beliefs). 
 145.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Simon & Brown 2012) (1869). 
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First, one could understand compelling-interest overrides as exceptions 
implied out of the very strictest necessity.  They are not stated in the text—a 
problem, to be sure—but they are arguably implicit in it as a background, 
structural principle embedded in the Constitution generally and against 
which the natural right of freedom for religious exercise should be read, 
understood, and limited.146  This is an imperfect textual argument, but not a 
ridiculous one.  Significantly, it supports a limitation on “compelling 
interest” exceptions to the text’s stated rule only for interests that are 
genuinely compelling—and not just for anything and everything government 
officials wish to do.  The fact that the text does not explicitly set forth such 
exceptions should operate as a check against their too-frequent or too-easy 
invocation.  The presumption runs, strongly, against any such implied 
exception.  A compelling interest, to be read into the text as an implied 
exception, has to be, truly, compelling, “paramount,” of “the highest 
order.”147  This, I submit, accords with the nature of the Free Exercise Clause 
as an affirmative natural right, protecting the (general) supremacy of free 
religious exercise over state power.   
A second way of re-thinking “compelling state interest” is that it is 
perhaps wrong in the first place to view the issue in terms of the state’s 
interests as trumping a claim otherwise authorized by the text of the Free 
Exercise Clause.  The very formulation subtly implies ultimate state 
supremacy, rather than the priority of God.  Rather, the phrase may be better 
thought an imprecise, inartful way of saying that the conduct at question is 
simply outside the domain of what “the free exercise of religion” embraces, 
as a matter of the original public meaning of the term itself.  The term “free 
exercise thereof” may itself entail a limitation in its scope to conduct that 
does not seriously injure others outside the religious community and that 
does not result in imposition of massive costs on society at large or on 
specific individuals.  Just as, for example, “the freedom of speech” includes 
both more and less than everything that fits the category of “speech,”148 so 
 146.  I have suggested elsewhere that the Constitution’s structure and logic supports a principle of 
“necessity” as a rule of construction, and perhaps a freestanding substantive rule, counseling against 
readings of rights and powers that threaten to destroy the essential enterprise of constitutional 
government, or work truly massive harm on individuals or society, and that this, more than explicit 
textual command, is the best explanation of many “compelling interest” tests in current 
constitutional doctrine.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1257, 1281–82 (2004); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional 
Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 721–26 (2004) (noting significance of President Lincoln’s 
use of such an interpretive premise to justify his construction of presidential war and emergency 
powers under certain circumstances). 
 147.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 148.  Some “speech” is categorically excluded from “the freedom of” speech as a matter of the 
original meaning of the phrase taken as a whole, in historical context.  And, on the other side, certain 
expressive conduct, most expressive association, and the freedom not to engage in compelled 
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too with religious freedom “the free exercise thereof” simply might not 
include, as a matter of original meaning, conduct imposing such grave harms 
on others, outside the relevant religious community.  The right to “the free 
exercise thereof” may well be thought of as entailing some kind of a 
jurisdictional principle that, while preventing the state from importing its 
rules into the sphere of religious autonomy also prevents the religious 
adherent from exporting his rule into the sphere of society outside of the 
religious community, by imposing severe externalities.149 
The third way to re-understand “compelling interest” may be the most 
radical: one could understand limitations on religious liberty claims as 
resulting from precisely the religious justification for religious liberty.  If the 
purpose of and underlying justification for religious liberty is to promote 
true religious exercise—true obedience to true commands of God—then 
such a liberty in principle (and practically by definition) excludes conduct 
one can confidently say proceeds from views outside the realm of 
conceivably correct views about what God requires or commands. 
On this explanation, a religiously based claim to immunity from the 
usual rules of society fails if the conduct claimed to flow from religious duty 
violates the clear, universal moral command of God.  In other words, the 
religious adherent’s claim that God’s command to him is prior to, and 
superior to, society’s command, is one that we are prepared to say, however 
reluctantly, is simply objectively wrong.  The freedom claimed is simply not 
one that fairly and plausibly can be attributed to a true command of God.  
For example, we can confidently say, as a matter of universal religious and 
moral truth, that God (by whatever name called) did not command al Qaeda 
members to commit mass murder.  Such a religious claim is simply false, 
whether or not (and I think it not) it is a plausibly correct explication of 
Islam itself and whether or not it is sincerely believed.  The extreme, 
murderous claims of radical Islamism are simply false claims about God, 
and are constitutionally unprotected for that reason. 
In the end, this is the most persuasive—but also surely the most 
dangerous, if misapplied—argument for overriding claims to religious 
expression, are all part of “the freedom of” speech, though they extend beyond literal speech.  See 
Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, supra note 23, at 1921; see also PAULSEN ET AL., THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 23, at 950–58 (setting forth a “map” of “the 
freedom of speech” under the Free Speech Clause). 
 149.  This idea that the Free Exercise Clause sets forth something of a “jurisdictional” principle 
was first suggested by a former professor of mine, Professor Perry Dane, in a brilliant student note.  
Perry Dane, Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing 
Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980). 
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liberty on the ground that denying such claims is necessary to prevent 
exceptional harm.  My suggestion here is surprising and unfamiliar, in part 
because our modern era recoils at the idea of describing any claimed 
religious belief as “wrong.”  But I submit that this is not because we think 
such beliefs as al Qaeda’s might be right; rather, it is because our era doubts 
that any claimed religious belief is “right.”  We rapidly default to a type of 
relativism that forbids making any kind of distinctions among claims made 
in the name of religion.  It is presumptuous and unacceptable, to modern 
understandings, to treat any religious belief or exercise as categorically or 
even presumptively more right or wrong than any other.  It is thus hard for 
those holding the modern conception to fathom an approach that would 
justify overriding free exercise claims premised on the view that some free 
exercise claims are simply untenable as claims about God’s true 
commands.150 
But is mine really so presumptuous a view?  Are there not some things 
that are objectively wrong?  And do not our intuitions in this regard 
ultimately flow from received cultural understandings of what God truly 
does or does not command?  To be sure, we should be careful about making 
such claims—claims of the objective falsity of an asserted religious belief.  
The proposition, pressed too far, contains the seeds of destruction of the 
principle of religious liberty.  Past a certain point, quickly reached, the 
business of judging the truth or validity of religious beliefs destroys 
religious liberty.  We rightly ask: on what principle, consistent with the 
premises of religious liberty, can government engage in such enterprise at 
all?151 
But up to a point, the inquiry is practically unavoidable.  All views of 
the Free Exercise Clause require some initial inquiry into the sincerity of the 
believer’s purported claim and whether the state action in question imposes a 
cognizable burden on something that qualifies as religious practice.  All 
views, at least to that extent, judge the validity of a claimed right to exercise 
religion. 
Think for a moment about what ultimately lies beneath the intuition that 
certain claims of religious freedom simply cannot be honored.  At bottom, I 
 150.  The attitude is of a piece with that which produced the extension of the meaning of 
“religion” to include non-religious ethical beliefs or principles, discussed above. 
 151.  It has long been held that government may not evaluate the truth or validity of a religious 
belief.  See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944) (stating that “[h]eresy trials are 
foreign to our Constitution” and holding that truth or falsity of religious beliefs cannot be submitted 
to jury determination); cf. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) 
(“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order 
to merit First Amendment protection.”); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 
(1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
449 (1969) (finding that courts are not competent to adjudicate “controversies over religious doctrine 
and practice”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871) (“The law knows no heresy . . . .”). 
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submit, it is one of four thoughts.  First, one might think that there is not 
really a God who makes claims on humans.  That is, the claimants’ claims 
are simply not real; the claimant is delusional.  (That view of course entails a 
denial of the core premise justifying religious liberty.)  Second, one might 
think that the religious claim is not sincerely believed by the claimant, but a 
mere pretext or sham—the claimant is lying.  (This inquiry is permitted 
under essentially all approaches, at least as a threshold inquiry.)  Third, one 
might think that the particular religious belief asserted, even if sincerely 
held, is simply not true—that, even accepting that God exists and imposes 
duties on humans, the believer simply has it wrong.  God exists, yes, but 
God did not command that.  For example, God did not command al Qaeda to 
kill innocents.  The claim is simply incompatible with what we know and 
believe about what God might actually command.  (This is the position I am 
advancing.) 
Finally, there is a fourth possible intuition: that even if one accepts God, 
agrees that God makes demands on human behavior, and agrees that in 
theory God might make commands that (from a human standpoint) seem 
unreasonable, unbelievable, and even immoral, we should still reject certain 
religious freedom claims on the ground that what God (purportedly) has 
commanded is simply a terrible, awful thing.  That is, granting arguendo the 
possibility that God might truly command something horrible, man should, 
in this respect at least, reject God’s supposed will.  This is a seemingly 
paradoxical position, but not a nonsensical one.  It simply adopts an 
overwhelming presumption in favor of the morality, consistency, and 
integrity of God with respect to perceived universal moral commands.  
While it acknowledges on theological grounds the (theoretical) possibility of 
God-prescribed exceptions to, new revelations of, or departures from what 
were believed to have been God’s universal moral commands, it refuses to 
accept such claims as valid claims to the free exercise of religion where, 
from a human perspective, they would work great human harms of the types 
discussed above.152   
 152.  It may sound strangely incongruent with traditional western understandings of God to say 
that human beings should reject what they believe are the true but morally horrible commands of 
God—and that the constitutional protection of free exercise of religion likewise ought not extend to 
obedience to such commands.  Yet this is sometimes the operative intuition, both at the level of the 
individual believer and at the level of a society that respects and seeks to honor religious belief to the 
maximum degree.  For example, even devout religious believers sometimes may doubt—and 
probably should doubt—the propriety of following the perceived commands of God in certain 
circumstances.  First, they may doubt, (probably rightly) the correctness of their perceptions that 
God has in fact commanded or required some morally dubious course of conduct.  Second, they 
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A slight variation might be the position that, while God might in theory 
command humans to do something terrible and contrary to the believed 
character of God, a truly extraordinary burden of proof rests on someone 
making such a claim.  Society should not accept its validity unless that 
practically insurmountable burden is satisfied.  (Show us the burning bush 
that spoke to you a command to murder, rape, pillage, steal, or wage 
genocidal war and then we will consider your free exercise claim.)153 
In the end, it is a sound intuition that there are some situations in which 
a claimed right to religious exercise must fail.  But it is important to be clear 
on why that should be so, in order to know when such an override to the 
presumed right of religious free exercise is proper.  It would not be 
consistent with the premises of the Free Exercise Clause, and religious 
liberty, simply to say that there is no God who makes claims on individuals’ 
conduct.  The whole point of religious freedom is to protect the right and 
ability of persons to act in conformity with true commands of God.  But it is 
consistent with the premises of the Free Exercise Clause to say that it 
excludes fraudulent, feigned claims of religious liberty.  In such cases, there 
is no true command of God to be obeyed.  Likewise, it is consistent with the 
premises of the Free Exercise Clause to say that a claim, made in the name 
of religion, is invalid if it contradicts the apparently clear, universal moral 
command of God.  In such a case, as in the case of an insincere or pretext 
claim, there is no true command of God to be obeyed.  There are some things 
that we can and should confidently say God thinks are always and 
everywhere wrong (or at least we should so presume).  Claims to engage in 
such conduct are simply beyond the ambit of the text’s protection of the free 
exercise of religion. 
might doubt the moral propriety of obeying even what they are fully convinced is the command of 
God.  (The latter situation might well lead the religious adherent to question the correctness of his 
perception that God has in fact commanded the conduct in serious moral conflict with the believer’s 
prior understandings or intuitions about God’s nature and character.)  A believer thus might well 
make the moral choice (whether rightly or wrongly) to act in deliberate disobedience to the 
perceived command of God.  (Religious believers obviously act in disobedience to the believed true 
commands of God all the time, for reasons including moral weakness and lack of faith—in a word, 
“sin”—but that is a different matter.)  From a theological perspective, it also may be appropriate for 
one to argue with God when God is thought to have commanded something unreasonable or morally 
intolerable.  Consider the account in Genesis 18:22, where Abraham is reported negotiating with 
God to save Sodom, if Abraham can find fifty innocent people in the City.  God agrees, and 
Abraham proceeds to bargain God down to forty-five, forty, thirty, twenty, and finally ten.  The deal 
is struck at ten, but Sodom still loses.  See Genesis 18:22–33 (Today’s English Version).). 
  A society’s stance on religious freedom might validly take a similar view: that even assuming 
that some act in theory might have been commanded by God, obedience to a morally horrible 
“divine command” nonetheless should not be treated as constitutionally protected conduct—not 
because society’s rules should trump God’s but because of legitimate doubt that such a horrible 
command really could be a true directive of God.   
 153.  I owe this alternative formulation to a thoughtful conversation with my colleague, Professor 
Teresa Collett. 
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But we should reach this conclusion not because of any claim that the 
state is supreme—that its compelling interests prevail over God’s 
commands.  Rather, it is because we accept the idea of the priority of God’s 
true commands that we should reject claims that we know to be contrary to 
God’s clear, universal moral commands. 
What sorts of things are included in that description?  There will still be 
arguments over what falls in this category and what does not.  There will 
still be close cases, difficult cases, and uncertain lines.  That problem exists 
under any approach that takes Free Exercise seriously.  If the text of the 
Constitution requires those applying it faithfully to engage in that sometimes 
difficult process, that is what must be done.  The approach I have suggested 
does not pretend to eliminate this problem, but would simply resolve more 
contested issues in favor of religious claimants—relocating the line-drawing 
inquiry to a different range on the continuum of possible claims.  The 
arguments will be somewhat different arguments, and somewhat different 
cases will be the difficult cases, for somewhat different reasons, than under 
pre-Smith “compelling interest” jurisprudence.  In the main, the type of 
conduct that will fail of constitutional protection is of the type specifically 
and consistently prohibited by the moral codes of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, in things like the Ten Commandments and comparable New 
Testament moral codes, and their counterparts in Islam and most other 
theistic and even polytheistic religions.154  To a surprising degree, these 
common moral prohibitions track the “compelling interest” libertarian 
exclusions noted above (although with certain differences with respect to 
prohibitions on sexual conduct, which depart from at least modern-day 
libertarian sensibilities).  Thus, the debates over what conduct cannot 
plausibly be attributed to God’s commands might end up looking 
considerably like debates over what conduct falls outside the bounds of 
libertarian toleration: conduct inflicting serious injury upon non-consenting 
third-parties (murder, rape, robbery, fraud, slavery, abortion, aggressive war, 
genocide, or other grave harm to others who are not part of the religious 
community.)  In such cases, the state’s interests prevail over the religious 
claimant’s not because the state says so, and not because John Stuart Mill 
might have thought so, but because God thinks so.155 
 154.  See, e.g., Exodus 20:13–17 (Today’s English Version); Romans 1:18–32 (Today’s English 
Version); 1 Corinthians 5:11, 6:9–10 (Today’s English Version). 
 155.  I do not wish to engage in a systematic consideration of every conceivable claim to religious 
freedom in conflict with secular law, or even to address how every Free Exercise Clause decision of 
the Supreme Court should have been decided.  But I depart from that policy, to an extent, simply to 




* * * 
The Free Exercise Clause is thus best understood as a sweeping 
protection of freedom to engage in religious conduct, even when at odds 
with the usual commands of civil government.  Understood as protecting the 
priority of God’s commands over man’s, the Free Exercise Clause means 
that religious conduct is presumptively immune from the usual authority of 
the state.  It means that religious conduct and only religious conduct—
conduct rooted in the believer’s understanding of the commands or 
expectations of God, and not a mere personal moral or ethical philosophy or 
analogous secular belief system—is, to the extent of the Free Exercise 
Clause’s constitutional immunity from government’s power, affirmatively 
preferred to non-religious conduct.  And it means that the limitations on 
religious freedom are, likewise, better understood as flowing from 
essentially religious limits on what plausibly can be credited as a true 
command or requirement of God, not merely from ad hoc evaluation of the 
importance of asserted secular interests of civil government. 
note that, under the view I have sketched here, several of the Supreme Court’s decisions are certainly 
wrong and many more are at least questionable.  E.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (no 
showing of pretext or universally wrongful conduct posing grave injury to private rights of non-
consenting third parties); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Bowen v. 
Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (wrong in part; questionable in part); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 
503 (1986); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Bob Jones Univ. 
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Heffron v. Int’l 
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (wrong on disregarded free exercise 
claim even if right on addressed free speech ground); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) 
(wrong as to religious claimant); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (outrageously wrong 
holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not forbid government from compelling public 
affirmation contrary to religious conviction); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) 
(dubious pre-incorporation case: questionable whether non-vaccination on religious grounds injures 
non-consenting third parties by wrongful conduct external to the religious community); Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (no showing of pretext or universally wrongful conduct posing 
grave injury to private rights of non-consenting third parties).  In each of these cases, the religious 
adherent’s claims were neither insincere nor discredited as obviously contrary to clear, universal 
moral commands of God, nor such as demonstrably to work serious injury to the baseline or natural 
rights of non-consenting third parties, outside the relevant religious community.  In addition, Locke 
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), is wrong even on the narrow view of free exercise as invalidating 
only laws that single out religious conduct for discriminatory treatment. 
  I have discussed some of these cases at length in other writing addressing the Free Exercise 
Clause issues presented therein.  See Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, supra note 5, at 265–68 
(discussing United States v. Lee, Bowen v. Roy, Hernandez v. Commissioner, Goldman v. 
Weinberger, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association); Paulsen, Equal Protection Approach, supra note 5, at 362–68 (discussing Bob Jones 
University v. United States,461 U.S. 574 (1983)). 
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B.  The Establishment Clause as a Protection of Freedom—For Religion 
What about the Establishment Clause?  How does it fit within this 
understanding of religious freedom?  Does it fit at all?  Does it not lean 
rather against the idea of special protection of religious conduct, and thus 
the strong pro-exemptions reading of the Free Exercise Clause, by 
forbidding government from “favoring” religion? 
These questions have altogether straightforward answers, but those 
answers have eluded modern courts and commentators.  Blinded by the 
modern paradigm, and seemingly indifferent to how anachronistic it is as a 
mode of understanding the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment 
(proposed and adopted in the late eighteenth century), modern would-be 
interpreters of the Establishment Clause have sought to transform it from a 
cognate protection of religious liberty into a limitation on religion.  On this 
reading, the Establishment Clause checks religion’s ability to play a role in 
public life and balances government’s (including courts’) constitutional duty 
to accommodate free exercise with a requirement of secular neutrality 
toward religion.  The Establishment Clause comes first, textually, and on 
this view of it constrains both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech 
Clause, which follow.  Religion should be excluded from the public square; 
religious arguments and advocacy should be excluded from public discourse; 
religious motivations should invalidate laws reflecting such motivation or 
inspiration; religious speakers and groups should not be accorded equal 
access to public forums for expression or public benefits to which they 
would otherwise be entitled; and religious free exercise should never be 
specially accommodated, in the form of specifically religious exemption 
from laws of otherwise general applicability.156 
Under the original conception of religious liberty embodied in the 
religion clauses, each of these conclusions is wrong—indeed, 180 degrees 
wrong; they state exactly the opposite of the original meaning of the First 
Amendment.  If religious liberty exists for the benefit of religion—as a 
freedom for religion, protecting it from government—it becomes utterly 
implausible to read the Establishment Clause as some sort of anti-religion 
counterweight to the Free Exercise Clause—a freedom from religion.  It is 
also implausible as a simple textual matter to read the First Amendment as 
 156.  For accounts (and criticism) of such views, as applied in various issue-specific contexts and 
discussing specific cases, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Things Happened on the Way to the 
Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on ‘Equal Access’ for Religious Speakers and 
Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 653–68 (1996); Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, supra note 5, at 800–
19. 
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deliberately embracing self-contradictory principles.157  Rather, the 
Establishment Clause can be seen in its natural, and original, sense as a 
protection of religious liberty motivated by the second of the paradigms 
discussed in Part II, above: it embodies the view that religious truth exists 
but that the secular state has no proper role in prescribing religious 
orthodoxy or compelling religious observance.  The Establishment Clause is 
not a freedom-from-religion provision.  It is a freedom-of-religion-from-
government provision.  It specifically dis-empowers the state in matters of 
religious exercise.  As such, it is of a piece with the conception of religious 
liberty as reflecting the view that God’s commands have priority over the 
state’s; it embraces a corollary proposition, that the state is not competent to 
decide for individuals what is true religion and what God’s commands are. 
This too reflects religious premises, widely subscribed to in religious, 
post-Great Awakening (yet still Enlightenment-influenced) America—the 
America that existed at the time of the framing of the Religion Clauses—that 
genuine religious faith does not come from coercion, but from free inquiry 
and free persuasion; that religious truth prospers best in an atmosphere of 
liberty; and that religious truth does not require government coercion to 
prosper, but instead can be impeded by such coercion.  Such notions are not 
in any sense a retreat from belief in the priority of God and God’s 
commands.  On the contrary, they are an application of that belief: the 
priority of God, taken seriously, means the consistent disavowal of state 
authority in matters of religion. 
The Establishment Clause, then, is a provision that prohibits government 
from compelling or requiring persons to engage in religious exercise against 
their will.  It “imposes a disability on the exercise of government power in 
such a manner as to compel religious belief or exercise or to punish failure 
to adhere to a state-prescribed religious orthodoxy.”158  As I have explained 
(at much greater length) elsewhere, the Establishment Clause protects the 
free non-exercise of religion in the same breath that the Free Exercise Clause 
 157.  See Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1613–14 n.9 (collecting 
arguments and authorities); see also Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, supra note 5, at 801–02.  The Supreme 
Court persists in embracing a limited version of this odd Religion-Clauses-as-self-contradiction 
position in dicta noting a supposed “tension” between the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause and the need to find some room for “play in the joints” between competing 
principles.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702 (2012); 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2005); Locke, 540 U.S. at 718–19. 
 158.  Paulsen, Making Sense of Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 1610.  I have advanced the 
following as a statement of the rule of law supplied by the Establishment Clause: 
Government may not, through direct legal sanction (or threat thereof) or as a condition of 
some other right, benefit, or privilege, require individuals to engage in acts of religious 
exercise, worship, expression or affirmation, nor may it require individuals to attend or 
give their direct and personal financial support to a church or religious body or ministry. 
Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, supra note 5, at 43. 
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protects the free exercise of religion.159  The clauses work in parallel, and 
operate in a similar fashion, protecting a single value of freedom for 
religion, but from two directions.  The Establishment Clause forbids 
government prescription of religious exercise; the Free Exercise Clause 
forbids government proscription of religious exercise.  They are not at all 
contradictory or even in tension.  Rather, they are two sides of the same 
coin.160 
It follows that the Establishment Clause certainly does not require the 
exclusion of religious speakers, groups, and persons, from public forums and 
public benefits.  It follows that the Establishment Clause is not so much 
concerned with government “endorsement” of religion as with actual 
coercion of religious exercise.161  Endorsement without coercion is simply 
government speech, which may be troubling and irritating at times, but in 
principle poses no different problem for government speech about religion 
than for government speech on any other topic.  And it follows, most 
significantly, that the Establishment Clause neither disfavors 
accommodation of genuine religious exercise, leans against the exemptions 
reading of the Free Exercise Clause as an affirmative substantive right, nor 
requires that religious and non-religious conscientious claims be treated 
alike.  A reading of the Establishment Clause that emasculates the Free 
Exercise Clause—and the core idea that religious liberty exists specifically 
to protect religion—is simply not faithful to the original, core conception of 
religious liberty under the First Amendment. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The view I have sketched here is in some ways radical.  It represents a 
major departure, in its basic conception, from most accounts of 
constitutional religious freedom in America today.  Further, it contemplates 
a fairly radical revision of current First Amendment doctrine.  In another 
sense, however, the view I have sketched here is merely restorative.  Its 
radicalism (if it really can be called that) lies in its return to original 
principles—a return to a lost, or at least neglected, account of the real reason 
 159.  Paulsen, Equal Protection Approach, supra note 5, at 313–14; see also Paulsen, Lemon is 
Dead, supra note 5, at 800–08. 
 160.  See supra note 158. 
 161.  Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 933 (1986).  For a lighthearted take on the issue of government “endorsement” of religion 
through speech or symbols, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is St. Paul Unconstitutional?, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 1 (2006). 
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for religious liberty, as understood at the time of the formation of the 
Constitution.  To the extent we have wandered far from those original 
principles and reasons; to the extent that our world today looks and feels 
very different from the more religiously serious world in which the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment were incubated and hatched; to the extent 
that our now long-familiar modern doctrinal constructs and paradigms 
ignore or slight those original reasons for, and original meanings of, freedom 
for religion; and to the extent returning to those original views would 
produce sometimes surprising conclusions and results, the constitutional 
view I have sketched here will appear radical.  The challenge I offer is to 
return to this lost world, on the ground that it is the correct way of 
understanding religious liberty under the original meaning of the 
Constitution’s Religion Clauses, and that such meaning must be regarded as 
controlling for us today for as long as we are governed by a written 
Constitution that contains those provisions. 
In his insightful commentary on this paper in draft form, when I 
presented it at the “Conflicting Claims” conference sponsored by Pepperdine 
University School of Law in February 2012, Professor Eugene Volokh cut 
me to the quick—or so I felt, at first—with the seemingly devastating 
objection (or insult) that my proposed reinterpretation of the Religion 
Clauses, under which good faith claims of religious liberty very often but not 
always defeat application of society’s laws to particular religious conduct, 
transformed the Free Exercise Clause into a “Super-Lochner” doctrine.  My 
reading, Volokh charged, like the discredited Lochner doctrine of 
“substantive due process,” would license courts to strike down the 
application of society’s laws whenever they impair specified claims of 
“liberty.” 162 
Professor Volokh’s objection has some persuasive force—and 
considerable rhetorical power.  It is essentially the objection that Justice 
Scalia made to a strong reading of the Free Exercise Clause at the conclusion 
 162.  The doctrine of “substantive due process,” while intellectually discredited, keeps coming 
back—like a bad penny.  Its first cataclysmic appearance to invalidate a major legislative act was in 
the Supreme Court’s monstrous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), though the 
doctrine is most closely associated with the case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  The 
Supreme Court decisively repudiated the Lochner approach, which reigned for nearly forty years in 
the early-twentieth century, in a series of cases in the mid-twentieth century, only to return to the 
doctrine in a different form in the last third of the twentieth century.  See PAULSEN ET AL., supra 
note 23, at 1515–47.  For an excellent grand tour of the rise, fall, rise, fall, and rise of this generally 
discredited doctrine, see Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (2004). 
  Professor Volokh’s “Super-Lochner” quip had special bite for me because I have been a 
consistent and sometimes vehement critic of the doctrine.  See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1007–25 (2003); see also 
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 30, at 895–
97. 
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of his majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,163 and that may 
well have been the driving psychological intuition underlying the entire 
Smith opinion. 
But I wonder.  As I replied at the conference: What if there really were a 
“Substantive Due Process Clause” in the Constitution?  What if the 
Constitution actually said something like this: “Government may make no 
law prohibiting economic freedom.”  As undesirable as Professor Volokh 
(and I) might think such a constitutional provision, if it were really there in 
the Constitution, it presumably would be the duty of judges and political 
officials (and law professors) to apply and follow it faithfully, irrespective of 
their views as to its desirability.  The task of faithful constitutional 
interpretation would be to seek to discern and correctly apply the original 
public linguistic meaning of such an Economic Substantive Due Process 
Clause.  And if the proper performance of that task produced something 
resembling a Lochner doctrine—even a “Super-Lochner” doctrine—so be it. 
And so I chose, and still choose, to embrace Professor Volokh’s insult-
insight rather than deny it: The Free Exercise Clause is, within the sphere of 
its objects, a Super-Lochner doctrine.  If the account I have given here is 
correct, the Free Exercise Clause in fact says something akin to my 
hypothetical Economic Substantive Due Process clause.  It does not say that 
government may “make no law prohibiting economic freedom,” but it does 
say that government shall “make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of 
religion.  Interpreting and applying such a provision may be very much like 
interpreting my imagined Economic Substantive Due Process Clause.  
Accordingly, taken seriously on its own terms, the Free Exercise Clause may 
well entail a “Super-Lochner” doctrine of a sort.  It is a Super-Lochner 
Clause limited to specific kinds of claims of individual liberty.  The objects 
the right embraces, and the limitations on its scope, are ones specific to that 
text.  It does not operate to invalidate a law in its entirety, but merely to 
prevent its application to specific individual or group religious conduct.  But 
it does trump, more than occasionally, the usual powers of government.  It is 
like Lochner in that respect, to be sure. 
But it is unlike Lochner in that, unlike the hypothetical Economic 
Substantive Due Process Clause, there really is a Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.  That clause, understood in historical-social and linguistic 
context, takes as its starting point the premise that individual claims to freely 
 163.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990) (“It is . . . horrible to contemplate 
that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of 
religious practice.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:44 PM 
 
1222 
exercise the requirements or duties of their religious faith really should and 
do, in principle, have priority over the competing commands of the state.  
The Free Exercise Clause is thus best read to bar application of laws that 
operate so as to prohibit the free exercise of religion.  It generally 
excludes—exempts—good-faith (pun intended) religious conduct from the 
ambit of secular government’s authority, subject to defeasance only in the 
most clear and extreme circumstances in which the claimed right can be said 
not to have a good-faith basis in anything that can be plausibly attributed to 
the commands of God.  The First Amendment Religion Clauses, in short, are 
a constitutional trump on what would otherwise be regarded as the proper 
authority of the state, flowing from a natural law understanding of the 
priority of God’s true claims on human conduct over any competing 
obligation imposed by Man. 
